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I. Introduction: In Quest of a Solution for the
West Bank and Gaza
A. Plus fa Change, Plus Clest la Meme Chose
1
At the end of the nineteenth century the Jewish
people, importing from Europe the notion of national-
ism, laid the foundations for the realization of a
dream of eighty preceding generations: the reconsti-
tution of a separate Jewish entity in Zion. The home-
coming immigrants were not welcomed by the local Arab
population in Palestine. It was, however, not until
more than a whole generation had passed--by the begin-
ning of the 1920s--that the Arab hostility crystal-
lized into a distinct Palestinian national movement.
After another generation of bitter, tense strife
over Palestine between the two contending national
movements, the rivalry, now at a peak, was brought for
determination to the world community. On November 29,
1947, the General Assembly of the United Nations re-
solved that Palestine be partitioned for the establish-
ment of an Arab state and a Jewish state. The Jews en-
dorsed the resolution with alacrity; the Arabs repudi-
ated it. The local Arab community launched a full-
scale attack on the Jewish community in Palestine im-
mediately following the resolution. The State of Is-
rael was proclaimed amidst hostilities; it was at once
invaded by neighboring Arab states, which for more
than two decades thereafter assumed the leading coun-
ter-role in the conflict.
Following the 1948 War, the Jordanian army retained
the West Bank while Gaza was retained by the Egyptian
army. In 1950, the West Bank was annexed to the Hashe-
mite Kingdom of Jordan, while Gaza remained under the
military control of Egypt. During the Six Day War of
1967, after yet another generation of animosity, Israel
captured the West Bank and Gaza. In the years since
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that war, the Palestinian national movement has re-
emerged and asserted a position in the vanguard of the
struggle against Israel, a process which reached its
peak with the conclusion of a Treaty of Peace between
Israel and Egypt on March 1979.
Many things in the Middle East have changed in the
more than half a century of strife between Arabs and
Jews over Palestine: empires have been dissolved; many
new states have emerged; global powers have evacuated
the region to be superseded by other global powers; old
regimes have been taken over by new ones; unions and
alignments have risen and fallen; and many people, both
Arabs and Jews, have shifted their domicile from one
country to another. Yet one thing has remained con-
stant throughout: the contention over the same land
between the two peoples living in Palestine, the
Palestinian and the Jewish people. There are no
eternal conflicts. There are no insoluble conflicts.
Yet, the longer the animosity and violence in the rela-
tionship between the two peoples is allowed to last,
the more entrenched become the barriers of the past.
It is incumbent on our generation to bring conciliation
between the Palestinian and the Jewish people and to
create a new era of peace and co-operation for mutual
benefit in the Middle East.
B. The Framework for Peace in the MiddZe East
For more than two years now, the effort to estab-
lish peace in the Middle East has been governed by the
two Camp David Accords: the Framework for Peace in the
Middle East and the Framework for the Conclusion of a
Peace Treaty between Israel and Egypt. 2 Now that the
Treaty of Peace between Israel and Egypt of March
19793 has superseded the second of these accords, the
Framework for Peace in the Middle East is the main
legal document delineating the principles for the
establishment of peace between Israel and its neigh-
bors. The essence of this Framework4 is a plan for
2. 78 Dep't State Bull. 7 (1978); 17 Int'l Legal Mat, 1466
(1978).
3. Treaty of Peace between the Arab Republic of Egypt and
the State of Israel, 18 Int'l Legal Mat. 362 (1979).
4. This accord, being the general framework for peace in
the Middle East, also includes a special part relating to the
establishment of peace between Egypt and Israel. See pt. B, 17
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the future arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza.
To give effect to the principles set forth in this
Framework, most diplomatic efforts concerning Middle
East peace conducted since the establishment of peace
between Egypt and Israel have been devoted to these
areas.
There is a distinction in the Framework for Peace
in the Middle East between a period of some transition-
al arrangements for the West Bank and Gaza and the
final status of these areas. According to the document,
in the transitional period "the Israeli military govern-
ment and its civilian administration will be withdrawn"
in order to provide "full autonomy" to the inhabitants
of the West Bank and Gaza. A self-governing authority,
freely elected by the inhabitants, will replace the
existing military government. In addition, the Israeli
armed forces will withdraw and there will be a redeploy-
ment of the remaining forces into specified security
locations. This transitional period will begin when
the self-governing authority is established and will not
exceed a period of five years.S
4. (Continued)
Int'l Legal Mat. 1468 (1978). See generally lMurphy, To Bring to
an End the State of Wazr: The Egyptian-Israeli Peace Treaty, 12
Vand. J. Transnat'l L. 897, 908-12, 924-29 (1979) (describing and
evaluating treaty in historical and contemporary perspective).
5. Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 17 Int'l Legal
Mat. 1466, 1467 (1978).
Under the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, Israel is
to negotiate the arrangements for the transitional period with
Egypt and Jordan, whose delegations may include "Palestinians from
the West Bank and Gaza or other Palestinians as mutually agreed."
Pt. A., art. 1.(B), 17 Int'l Legal Mat. 1467 (1978). As is well
known, neither Jordan nor the Palestinians have joined the nego-
tiations as of the present time. In a joint letter from President
Sadat and Prime Minister Begin to President Carter, sent on the
day of the conclusion of the Treaty of Peace between Egypt and
Israel (March 26, 1979), Egypt and Israel agreed that "In the event
Jordan decides not to take part in the negotiations, the negotia-
tions will be held by Israel and Egypt." The main issues to be
agreed on are the "modalities" for establishing the self-governing
authority and its "powers and responsibilities."
This part of the accord is typical of the drafting technique
used in the Framework for Peace in the Middle East, the essence of
which is the use of such formulae as will enable each party to
stick to its original position. Thus, Israeli military government
will be "withdrawn"--as distinct from "abolished"--but the self-
governing authority will "replace" the military government. Pt. A.,
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As soon as possible, but not later than the third
year after the beginning of the transitional period, ne-
gotiations will take place on two related issues: first,
the final status of the West Bank and Gaza, and the re-
lationship of this territory with its neighbors; second,
a peace treaty between Israel and Jordan, taking into
account the agreement reached on the first issue.6
The positions taken by the parties in their current
negotiations concerning the transitional period are
clearly influenced by their preferences as to the final
status of the areas. Although the Framework for Peace
in the Middle East provides no clues on this point, 7
some have assumed that, in fact, the arrangements of the
transitional period will shape the final status. 8
5. (Continued)
art. 1.(A). For another example, see the reference of the accord to
the self-governing authority. The first time that this institution is
mentioned in the accord, pt. A, art. 1.(A), it is referred to as "a
self-governing authority." However, in pt. A, art. 1.(C) this same
institution is the "self-governing authority (adinistrative council)."
17 Int'l Legal Mat. 1467-68 (1978). An additional example is the letters
attached to the Camp David accords relating to the status of Jerusalem
and to the meaning of the expressions "Palestinians" and "Palestinian
People." Letter from Mohamed Anwar El Sadat to Jimmy Carter (Sept. 17,
1978), letter from Menachem Begin to Jimmy Carter (Sept. 17, 1978),
letter from Jimmy Carter to Menachem Begin (Sept. 22, 1978). 17 Int'l
Legal Mat. 1473-74 (1978). See Eban, Camp David--The Unfinished
Business, 57 For. Aff. 343, 350 (1978-79). ("I[Tlhe document relating
to the West Bank and Gaza is deliberately equivocal. Both Begin and
Sadat portray it as consistent with their previous positions.")
6. The parties involved in the determination of the first issue
are supposed to be Egypt, Israel, Jordan, and the elected representa-
tives of the inhabitants. The last three parties are also supposed to
be the parties who determine the second issue. Pt. A., art. l(C), 17
Int'l Legal Mat. 1468 (1978).
7. The Framework is also silent as to the possibility that no
agreement will be reached by the end of the transitional period. It
is not clear whether the transitional arrangements are meant to con-
tinue in such a case until agreement is finally reached or whether to-
day's situation supersedes the transitional arrangement. If it is to
be the first alternative, the importance of the transitional arrange-
ments will clearly be magnified.
8. The main criticism within Israel against the Framework for
Peace in the Middle East has concerned the allegedly unavoidable
connection between the "transitional period" and the "final
status" of the West Bank and Gaza. See, e.g., Avishai, Israeli
Nerves After Camp David, 26 Dissent 23, 23 (1979) ("Camp David's
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C. Associate Statehood As A Feasible Solution
to the Problem
Among the options available for solution of the
problem posed by the West Bank and Gaza is one based
on the framework of associate statehood. It is the
thesis of this Article that this is the most suitable
option and that it should be considered thoroughly by
all parties involved in the Middle East co-t-Flict. There
are three arguments to support the plausibility of the
associate statehood option.
First, such a framework is capable of responding
to the basic interests of all parties concerned. Of
course, no feasible solution can lack this quality. The
point to stress, however, is that the solution of
associate statehood has its own viability whether or
not current accords regulating the effort to solve the
problem of the West Bank and Gaza are altered or re-
placed. Second, if the principle of "full autonomy"
for the inhabitants is indeed going to be implemented
in the West Bank and Gaza in accord with the Framework
for Peace in the Middle East, the solution of associate
statehood is the logical next step to follow a pattern
of power allocation based on the principle of autonomy.
8. (Continued)
autonomy plan for the Palestinians ... [was] contrived to accommo-
date the goals of the Brookings report, not Likud's platform, and
most Israelis seem to know it. In fact, over 50 percent expect
that the plan will lead to an independent Palestinian state in
spite of Begin's assurances to the contrary.") Likewise, according
to an Israeli daily, the conclusion of comprehensive research by
the Center for Strategic Studies, affiliated with the Tel-Aviv Uni-
versity, is that "the autonomy will evolve to a Palestinian state."
Yediot Acharonot, Sept. 20, 1979, at 8. In an international con-
ference on "Models of Autonomy" held by the Tel-Aviv University
Faculty of Law, it was the opinion of two of the participants
(Messrs. Dinstein and Yavetz) that although there have been cases
where autonomy was eliminated before it led to independence, gener-
ally autonomy is a transition to independence. According to
Dinstein, "For those who grant autonomy--autonomy is the end of
the matter. For those who obtain it, it is only the point of
departure." Tel-Aviv University Faculty of Law Newsletter, No. 2,
May 1980, on file with Yale Studies in World Public Order. But cf.
Heller, Begin's False Autonomy, 37 For. Pol. 111, 114, 116-17 (Begin
determined to resist any Palestinian autonomy).
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Third, the concept of associate statehood is flexible
enough to be compatible with a variety of political
arrangements when the moment for the final resolution
of the problem of the Ifest Bank and Gaza comes.
9
II. The Parameters of Associate Statehood
A. Associate Statehood As A Functional Modality
for Competence Allocation
In terms of power, in an interdependent1 0 world
like ours, the ability of states to effect outcomes
within other states increases--i.e., the autonomy of
every state decreases.1 1 On the bilateral level, how-
ever, one of the by-products of a high level of inter-
dependence is that it has become harder to maintain
relations of qualitative inequality, in terms of depen-
dence-independence, between two states.12
9. See Part VII, infra.
10. There is a large body of literature on the concept of in-
terdependence. See, e.g., R. Keohane and J. Nye, Power and Inter-
dependence (1977) (distinguishing between sensitivity interdepend-
ence and vulnerability interdependence); Young, Interdependencies
in World Politics, 24 Int'l J. 726 (1969) (rising level of inter-
dependence and its effects on world politics); McDougal, Lasswell
& Reisman, Theories About International Law: Prologue to a Con-
figurative Jurisprudence, 8 Va. J. Int'l L. 188, 189-92 (1968)
(manifestations of increasing interdependence and its impact upon
lives of individual human beings); Keohane and Nye, World Politics
and the International Economic System, in The Future of the Inter-
national Economic Order 115, 121-26 (C. Bergsten ed. 1973)(analysis
of situations of interdependence as source of power in internation-
al relations); Cooper, Economic Interdependence and Foreign Policy
in the Seventies, 24 World Pol. 159, 161-64 (1972)(discussing
growth of economic interdependence); Caporaso, Dependence, Depend-
ency and Power in the Global System: A Structural and Behavioral
Analysis, 32 Int'l Org. 13 (1978)(analyzing dependence component
of interdependent relationship).
11. Young, supra note 10, at 746-49.
12. Id. But cf. Keohane and Nye, World Politics, supra
note 10, at 122 (many relationships of interdependence in contem-
porary world remain highly asymmetric). Traditionally, military
strategies were perceived as the main instrument of power of in-
ternational relations and, in terms of sensitivity interdependence,
threats to state autonomy focused on the security area and terri-
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At times, the enduring external control exercised
over a state by another state or states is defined
overtly in an international agreement. 1 3 In extreme
cases this external control may be so great as to trans-
form a sovereign state into a subordinate political
unit.14 Short of such extreme situations, however, in-
ternational law recognizes the possibility that a unit
whose authority is significantly qualified by another
state may still remain a state.l5
12. (Continued)
torial integrity of states. See Keohane and Nye, orld Politics,
supra note 10, at 119-20; Nye, Multinational Corporations in orld
Politics, 53 For. Aff. 153, 154 (1974). In recent decades, how-
ever, with the expansion of intense transnational interaction,
strategies are perceived mainly in terms of economic measures, and
the focus of threats to state autonomy has shifted to the economic
areas. Keohane and Nye, World Politics, supra note 10, at 119-20;
Cable, Britain, The New Protectionism and Trade with the Newly
Industrializing Countries, 55 Int'l Aff. 1, 1 (1979). See also
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, The Morld Constitutive Process of
Authoritative Decision (Pt. 2), 19 J. Legal Ed. 403-15 (1967)(dis-
cussing four categories of strategy); Lillich, Economic Coercion
and the International Legal Order, 51 Int'l Aff. 358, 358 (1975)
(in contemporary era, economic considerations dominate interna-
tional as well as domestic political scene). This development
culminated in the 1970s when governments found it increasingly
difficult to implement economic policies because of adverse
economic effects imported to the domestic system from abroad.
See, e.g., Cooper, supra note 10, at 164, 178-79 (growing econQmic
interdependence negates the distinction between internal and
external policies underlying the present political organization
of the world into nation-states); Warnecke, The United States and
the European Community: The Changing Political and Economic
Context of Trade Relations, 30 J. Int'l Aff. 21, 22-23 (1976)
(effects of weakening of governments' capacity to pursue domestic
policies in economically interdependent world); Strange, Interna-
tional Economics and International Relations, 46 Int'l Aff. 304,
305 (1970)(effects on states of their common involvement in expand-
ing international economic network).
13. On the distinction between "power" and "authority," see
McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 12, at 256; Reisman, Law
from the Policy Perspective, in Law and Policy 75, 89 (D. Weisstub
ed. 1976).
14. See H. Lasswell and A. Kaplan, Power and Society 181
(1950).
15. See W. Reisman, Puerto Rico and the International Process
17-18, 74-77 (1975)(listing examples). See also 1 D. O'Connell,
International Law 304-05, 313-14 (1965)(discussing attributes of
statehood using example of Cyprus).
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The types of cases where the authority of a state
is qualified by another state for some lasting duration
are varied. One useful way to classify these cases is
through the distinction between territorial qualifica-
tions and functional qualifications.1 6
In cases of territorial qualification, the author-
ity of a state in regard to its territory is restricted
either through an authorization to another state to take
actions within a defined portion of that territory or
through an obligation taken by a state in regard to its
own conduct over some portion of its territory. The
most common examples for this type of qualification are
(l) bases operated by one state within the area of ano-
therl7 and C2) international servitudes.18
16. On the problem of treaty classification, cf. McNair, The
Law of Treaties 739-54 (1961) (distinguishing several types of
treaties including treaties relating to real rights and treaties
having the character of contract).
17. See 1 L. Oppenheim, International Law 455-58 (8th ed.
H. Lauterpacht ed. 1955) (listing examples); O'Connell, supra note
15, at 361-63 (listing examples).
18. The servitude of international law is a permanent
(durable) legal relationship established by a
particular international treaty whereby one
State, or a certain number of States, is or
are entitled to exercise rights within part
or the whole of the territory of another
State, for a special purpose or interest
relating to the territory in question, or
whereby a State is obliged towards another
State, or a certain number of States, not to
exercise certain of its rights within part or
the whole of its territory, for a special
purpose or interest relating to this territory.
F. Vali, Servitudes of International Law 309 (2d ed. 1958). For a
definition of servitudes in international law, see H. Reid, Inter-
national Servitudes in Law and Practice VII, 14, 29, 30 (1932);
Esgain, Military Servitudes and the New Nations, in The New Nations
in International Law and Diplomacy 42, 72 (1T. O'Brien ed. 1965).
The territorial element, i.e., the requirement that the territory
of one state serve the interest of another state, is the most
essential element in the concept of international servitudes. See
H. Reid, supra at 13, 21-25 (right must be territorial, not person-
al). See also F. Vali, supra at 305-06 (discussing territorial
relevancy of rights); L. Oppenheim, supra note 17, at 538-40 (terri-
tory as object distinguishing state servitudes from other restric-
tions). Hence, international servitudes are classified as "real"
rights. H. Reid, supra, at 13, 21. See F. Vali, supra, at 49 (con-
cept of servitudes in international law justified when equipped with
"real" characteristics).
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In cases of functional qualification the function
1 9
of a state is restricted through an authorization to
another state to administer some of its functions. As-
sociate statehood denotes functional qualifications of
the latter type. It is a formal and durable connection
between two states 2 0--i.e., both parties to the connec-
tion continue to maintain their international status of
statehood2l--the uniqueness of which lies in the modality
through which one party exercises control over the other.
According to Professor Reisman, the relationship is
characterized by the "subordination of and delegation of
competence by one of the parties Cthe associate) to the
other Cthe principal)... ,"22 The associate is left
devoid of the competence it has delegated to the princi-
pal. The principal, adding this delegated competence to
its own, is expected to apply it for the benefit of the
associate as well as for its own. Since both the associ-
ate and the principal continue to maintain their interna-
tional status of statehood, however, there remains an in-
herent limitation to the degree that competence may be
diminished and delegated.
B. Federal State, Confederation, and Associate
Statehood
To clarify the unique characteristics of associate
statehood it is useful to contrast this model with two
others available for states seeking mutual benefits
through co-operation: the federal state and the confed-
eration. 23
There are two major variations on the theme of main-
tenance of the international status of statehood by the
19, For a discussion of the "functional divisions" of a
state, see H, Lasswell and A. Kaplan, supra note 14, at 192-97.
20. W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 10 (association is formal
durable link between states of unequal power). For an analysis of
the framework of associate statehood, see id. at 9-20.
21. See id. at 10 (each component retains international
status of statehood).
22. Id.
23. In making the contrast, we should bear in mind MacIverts
warning: "No specific form of government endures, though there are
certain major type-forms that have at least a relative permanence
* [Plolitical structures . . . are not like . . . genera and
species of nature, which to a large extent persist and reproduce
themselves even though new forms evolve." R. MacIver, The Web of
Government 147 (1947).
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components of a federal state.24 Under the "Continental"
variation the components of a federal state "can be In-
ternational Persons in a degree.,. . [They are] Interna-
tional Persons for some purposes only."'2 5 Under the
"American" model, however, the federal state is a new
state, all of whose components have completely ceased
to maintain the international status of statehood.2 6
In the case of a confederation, on the other hand, the
outcome is not a new "super state" but merely an inter-
governmental organization.2 7 Thus, with both a confed-
eration and an association, and to a limited extent in
some forms of federal state, each of the participants
continues to maintain its international status of state-
hood.
In the case of associate statehood, power is divided
between the principal and the associate on a functional
basis:2 8 a preponderant amount of power in some sectors
is allocated to the principal in addition to the equiva-
lent power enjoyed by both parties in all other sectors.
This method of division of power differs from that of
both the federal state and the confederation. In the
case of the former there is in principle a clear dis-
tinction between the power allocated to the central
government and that allocated to the governments of
the components each government having its own exclusive
type of power.2 9 Thus, there should be no overlap be-
24. A federal state need not necessarily be established by
states; a unitary state may transform itself into a federal state
as well.
25. L. Oppenheim, supra note 17, at 177. See Sohn and
Shafer, Foreign Affairs, in Studies in Federalism 236, 237 (R.
Bowie and C. Friedrich eds. 1954) (component units of federation
can exercise foreign affairs powers under certain conditions);
D. O'Connell, supra note 15, at 317, 318, 349 (citing examples of
federal components having some international competence),
26. L. Oppenheim, supra note 17, at 178; W. Willoughby, The
Nature of the State 253, 254 (1896); R. Neumann, European and
Comparative Government 680 (3d ed. 1960).
27. L. Oppenheim, supra note 17, at 173; W. Willoughby,
supra, note 26, at 254; cf. D. O'Connell, supra note 15 at 317
(insufficient modern examples to determine this point).
28. See text accompanying notes 19-22 supra. For a discus-
sion of functional decentralization, see D. Lasswell & A. Kaplan,
supra note 14, at 225.
29. See C. Friedrich, Trends of Federalism in Theory and
Practice 17 (1968) (distinction between state level and nation
level); Reisman & Simson, Interstate Agreements in the American
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tween the powers allocated to the two types of govern-
ments, as there may be with associate statehood. In
confederation, on the other hand, the central machinery
established by the participants does not possess its
power to the exclusion of the powers of the individual
participants. Rather, the power of the central machi-
nery is identical and parallel to some of the power of
each participant, which has possessed it continuously.
3 0
C. Variations on the Number of Participants
Although the paradigmatic case of associate state-
hood is that of one principal and one associate, there
are other conceivable variations: one principal associ-
ated with more than one associate upon similar 31 or even
different terms, for instance; or, alternatively, the
association of one associate with more than one princi-
pal, each controlling distinct sectors or even the same
sector in a sort of "co-imperium.
''32
29. (Continued)
Federal System, 27 Rutgers L. Rev. 70, 77 (1973) (distinction
between powers of States and powers of federal government
in U.S. constitution). See also Bowie & Schrenk, Defense in Studies
in Federalism 173, 173, 175 (R. Bowie & C. Friedrich eds. 1954); 2
D. O'Connell, International Law 757-58 (1965) (discussing division
of power over aliens); id. at 951-52 (discussing immunity of sub-
divisions). Hence, one usually finds in federal states an accepted
process for distinguishing between central power and local power.
C. Friedrich, Constitutional Government and Democracy 210, 211 (4th
ed. 1968) (role of judiciary in federal systems); Freund, The Federal
Judiciary, in Studies in Federalism 106 (R. Bowie & C. Friedrich eds.
1954). Whereas power allocation in associate statehood could be
described in terms of functional allocation, see note 28 supra,
power allocation in federal states is often referred to in terms of
allocation on a territorial basis. See, e.g., H. Lasswell & A. Kap-
lan, supra note 14, at 225; C. Friedrich, supra, at 195.
30. W. Willoughby, supra note 26, at 254; L. Oppenheim, supra,
note 17, at 173.
31. In fact, such cases exist: for example, the association
of the United Kingdom and the West Indies island territories, the
association of the Netherlands with Surinam and the Netherlands
Antilles, and the association of New Zealand and the Cook Islands
and Niue. See part VI infra.
32. These indications are of considerable importance in the
context of the West Bank and Gaza where we deal with two cases of
geographically distinct territories (the West Bank and Gaza; the
1980] 307
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It is also possible to imagine a principal associ-
ated with an associate in regard only to part of the
associate's territory. That can occur where an associate
which is a federal state is associated with a principal
in regard to only one or to some of its components; or,
where some natural configuration creates a clear dis-
tinction between two parts of an associate which is a
unitary state.
3 3
III. New States: Situations Calling for Associate
Statehood
A. Why Associate Statehood?
Establishment of associate statehood is always con-
ditioned on the existence of a significant disparity be-
tween the competence of the principal and of the associ-
ate--at least in the functions on which the association
is based. This comparative advantage provides no indi-
cation on the relative position of the principal in those
32. (Continued)
West Bank and the East Bank of Jordan) and with more than one state
with a possible interest in either the West Bank or Gaza or in both
(Jordan, Israel, and even Egypt). The term "co-inrperium" usually
refers to situations where joint rights of administration are exer-
cised by two states. The term "condominiwm" refers to situations
of joint exercise of sovereignty by two states. The two most famous
cases of co-imperiun are the co-imperiwn of Great Britain and Egypt
over Sudan (1898-1956) and the French-British co-imperiwn over the
New Hebrides since 1914. See 1 M. Whiteman, Digest of International
Law 280-82 (1963). See generally L. Oppenheim, supra note 17, at
453-55 (analysing condominium as case of divided territorial sover-
eignty); O'Connell, The Condominium of the New Hebrides, 43 Brit.
Y.B. Int'l L. 71 (1968-69) (general discussion of condominium and
co-imperium and the New Hebrides case).
33. Cases of the latter type will immediately raise the
question whether the relationship created by the parties ought to
be perceived in terms of international servitude rather than asso-
ciate statehood. Three indicators will determine this question.
First, the existence or non-existence of a territorial element in
the delegation of competence to the principal. See note 18 supra.
Second, the intention of the parties, i.e,, did they intend to
create an arrangement for the benefit of one party only (servitude)
or for the benefit of both (association). See note 145 infra.
Third, the extent to which the type of competence delegated to the
principal is retained by the associate after the establishment of
the connection between them. See notes 19-22 supra and accompanying
text.
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areas vis-a-vis other members of the world arena; it is
not necessarily superior to all--or even to most--of
them. The establishment of an association requires no
more than that the principal have a substantial advan-
tage in a certain sector over no entity other than the
associate.3 4
The post-World War II decolonization period has
witnessed the emergence of an unprecedented number of
new states as participants in the world arena. Many of
these new states have been poor or even barely viable
economically; others have also been small both in terri-
tory and population.3 5 Indeed, the problem of the vast
gaps between developing and developed countries is one
of the major issues with which the international com-
munity has been occupied throughout the 1970s. 3 6
34. See cases reviewed in part VI, infra.
35. Broderick, Associated Statehood--A New Form of Decoloni-
zation, 17 Int'l & Comp. LQ. 368, 369, 370 (4th ser. 1968);
Caporaso, supra note 10, at 16. The literature on small states is
burgeoning. See, e.g., Keohane, Small States in International
Politics, 23 Int'l Org. 291 (1969) (review article); Fisher, The
Participation of Microstates in International Affairs, Am. Soc.
Int'l L. Proc. 164 (1968) (discussing special problems of micro-
states); Rappaport, The Participation of Ministates in Interna-
tional Affairs, Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 155 (1968) (United Nations
attitudes to small states problems).
36. There is an increasing amount of material being generat-
ed on this topic. See, e.g., W. Cline, Policy Alternatives for a
New International Economic Order: An Economic Analysis (1979);
Cooper, A New International Economic Order for Mutual Gain, 26 For.
Pol'y 66 (1977) (theoretical analysis of claims made by developing
countries and economic assessment of proposals advocated in this
context); Erb, "North-South" Negotiations, 32 Acad. Pol. Sci. Proc.
106 (No. 4, 1977) (review of North-South negotiations); Ferguson,
The Politics of the New International Economic Order, 32 Acad. Pol.
Sci. Proc. 142 (No. 4, 1977) (discussing political aspects of New
International Economic Order); Gosavic & Ruggie, On the Creation of
a New International Economic Order: Issue Linkage and the Seventh
Special Session of the UN General Assembly, 30 Int'l Org. 309 (1976)
(discussing background and implications of Seventh Special Session);
Amuzegar, The North-South Dialogue: From Confict to Compromise,
54 For. Aff. 547 (1976) (politico-economic analysis of relations
between poor developing countries and industrial countries).
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One of the options available for an emerging state
lacking sufficient economic resources has been to dele-
gate responsibility for management of one or more of
its sectors to another state, relatively more competent
in these areas, through the establishment of an associ-
ation. Generally, such a move has three advantages for
a state with limited resources. First, since competence
in a certain sector has been delegated to another state
which is significantly superior in that respect, prob-
lems arising in that sector of the delegating state can
be handled better than would otherwise be the case.
Second, the delegating state can now optimize its limit-
ed resources by allocating them to fewer sectors.3 7
Third, as all sectors of a state are interdependent, the
delegating state might expect to accrue benefits through
association in sectors additional to those delegated.3 8
Defense is the sector most likely to be delegated
to some other state by a non-developed newly emerging
state through the establishment of a framework of associ-
ate statehood, There are three reasons to justify this
contention.
First, defense is a matter to which almost every
state accords high priority. Second, however, defense
is relatively speaking a very costly enterprise.3 9 Obvi-
ously, if a state is released from responsibility for
its own defense, considerable resources are freed for
other essential purposes. 4 0 Moreover, there are many
37. See note 40 infra and accompanying text.
38. For example, the military presence of a principal within
the territory of the associate may benefit the economy of the as-
sociate. Likewise, military interest of a principal in the terri-
tory of an associate may lead to economic aid from the principal to
the associate as well as to some citizenship concessions for the
population of the associate which would not have been granted
otherwise. See note 78 infra (discussing case of Caribbean associ-
ated states); notes 77, 80 infra (Niue); note 76 infra (Cook Is-
lands); note 79 infra (three Micronesian entities).
39. See McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 12, at 293
(large size of investment required for defense is leading to more
inclusive power options). On the security problems of small states,
see W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 19-20; Keohane, supra note 35, at
293, 298, 301; Emerson Self-Determination, 65 Am. J. Int'l L. 459,
471 (1971).
40. This "guns vs. butter" argument was summed up as follows:
The proponents of this school of thought assume a
zero-sum social marketplace: what is spent on one
sector is taken away from another. They maintain
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reasons why the territory and the location of a mili-
tarily inferior state could be valuable for the security
needs of a potential principal: for example, assuring
denial of access to that territory by hostile forces;
operation of strategically important bases; and gaining




that buying arms utilizes scarce foreign-exchange
resources that could Be used for -more constructive
developmental purposes in industrializing countries.
Even military grant-aid programs require expendi-
tures on infrastructure, the diversion of skilled
manpower from the civilian sector, and operation
and maintenance costs not covered by military pro-
grams, Whatever positive spinoff effects military
expenditures may have, these analysts argue, they
cannot be as productive as direct investment in
development,
Neuman, Security, Military Expenditures and Socioeconomic Develop-
ment: Reflections on Iran, 22 OrBis 569, 583 (1978). See also
Letter to the Editor, 23 Orbis 471, 474 (1979) (applying considera-
tions of resource costs); Benoit, Growth and Defense in Developing
Counties, 26 Econ. Dev. Cult. Change 271, 276 (1978) (civilian
programs for growth make grehter contribution than defense programsi.
For a rejection of the "guns vs. butter" argument, see Neuman, supra,
at 570, 584-85. Moreover, it is relatively easy to isolate defense
from all other sectors for the purpose of its delegation to another
state. Thus, the economic sector, for example, is so much more
interdependent with all other sectors than is the defense sector
that to remove economic decisions from the scope of the associate's
competence would involve hardships that depriving it of responsi-
bility for its own defense would not.
41. A comparison of the defense sector to the economic
sector in this context reveals the relative suitability of the
former as a basis for the establishment of association. It seems
reasonable to assume that in cases where a state is furnished
with some economic potentiality that could be traded to a more com-
petent state, it would do its utmost to enjoy its benefits independ-
ently. A good example is the case of Nauru which, with 6,500 inhabi-
tants and 6.2 -ailes of territory chose, in 1968, the option of
independence because of the rich phosphate content of its soil.
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For much the same reasons, foreign affairs consid-
erations can be another important inducement to estab-
lishment of a relationship of associate statehood.
Control of the defense of a state and control of its
foreign affairs are clearly related, but that is a
secondary reason. It would be an enormous exaggeration
to claim that whenever State A controls the defense of
State B it necessarily also controls the foreign af-
fairs of State B. On the contrary, it could be argued
that in such a situation, except in regard to a very
few core issues, control by State A of the defense
sector of State B does not deprive the latter of sub-
stantial independence in conducting its foreign affairs. 42
Nonetheless, it is only natural that whenever an associ-
ate delegates its defense competence to a principal the
two states are likely to have a similar basic perspec-
tive in foreign affairs matters.
A major motivation for making foreign affairs a
basis for the establishment of an association, however,
could derive from the importance of international acti-
vity for internal development and from the costs involv-
ed in international activity. In an interdependent
world, the efficient implementation of internal policies
often involves the mobilization of external resources.4 3
Moreover, intensive international activity involves
costs Cmaintenance of missions, membership dues, etc.)
that might be too onerous for a state with limited
resources.4 4 Hence, a new state could conclude that
delegation of responsibility for its foreign affairs to
a state with greater competence in this area might make
its representation in international arenas more effective.
42. See W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 41-42, 122 (distinguish-
ing between areas of 'foreign affairs' and 'international relations').
For an association based on the delegation of the defense sector to
the principal while preserving the foreign affairs competence for
the associate, see the case of the three Micronesian entities, infra
note 79.
43. W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 4, 39. See Cooper, supra
note 36, at 116 (self-reliance is untenable in today's interdepen-
dent world); Morse, Transnational Economic Processes, 25 Int'l Org.
373, 399 (1971) (inability to pursue autarkic policies in contem-
porary era); Caporaso, supra note 10, at 17 (for most countries
autarky is unattractive strategy).
44. W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 52. See aZso Young, supra
note 10, at 741 (analyzing costs of dealing with other actors under
conditions of interdependence).
312 [VOL. 6
WEST BANK AND GAZA
B. Why Not Associate Statehood?
Even though the option of association can produce
considerable advantages for states with limited re-
sources, a survey of the behavior of such states reveals
that only in very few cases have they chosen to take
part in the establishment of an association. Several
reasons have contributed to that reluctance.
First, if defense is indeed the sector most likely
to be delegated by a new state to some other state, a
precondition for such a delegation is that the new state
must perceive its defense situation relative to its
neighbors or other potentially threatening countries as
so acutely inferior that it must seek an urgent improve-
ment of that sector through the military protection of
another, much stronger state.4 5 This is hardly the
common case.
Second, the role of armies is perceived in many
states in terms much broader than defense. As one
scholar has put it, although
. .[t]here is little doubt that the cost
of maintaining an army will always far
outweigh any kind of economic gains that
may be accrued through utilizing it in
some sort of productive capacity . . . even
in regions where international tension has
been relatively low, economic profitability
is not the only criterian of whether to
maintain an army, and in most cases it is
not even the main one . . . . [W]hile it is
most probably true that, in economic terms,
the best thing for any country is not to
have an army at all, other considerations
play a far more important role in such a
decision. 46
Thus, armies in emerging states have been perceived as
major agents for social and cultural change4 7 and for
45. Likewise, the "stronger" state has to perceive its in-
volvement in the defense of the weaker state as serving its own
interests.
46. Shabtai, Aray and Economy in Tropical Africa, 23 Econ.
Dev. Cult. Change 687, 695 (1975).
47. The military establishment, which in developed
countries often appears as rather archaic and
tradition bound, can in the LDC context have
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the creation and maintenance of a sense of national
integration, independence, and national pride.4 8
Moreover, no matter what the benefits, a state's
participation in an association as the associate still
entails significant constrictions on its authority.
There are often viable alternatives, e.,. partici-
pation in international organizations, 4
47. (Continued)
quite a different significance, as an
important force for modernization....
It ... inculcates in those it trains
a great many modern attitudes and
aptitudes.... Even more fundamental
is its revolutionary effect in des-
troying unquestioned acceptance of
local custom and tradition, in some-
times substituting a national for a
local, ethnic, tribal, or caste con-
sciousness and including modern ideas
and interests.
Benoite, supra note 40, at 277. See Shabtai, supra note 46, at
688-89 (on role of armies as agents of modernization in developing
countries).
48. Shabtai, supra note 46, at 695; Benoite, supra note 40,
at 277, 278 (army contributes to nation-building by instilling
pride). It might be assumed that considerations of modernization
and national pride also apply to foreign affairs activities of
developing countries.
International organizations also provide
opportunities for training and exposure
of the mid-elite, through secondment to
staff positions, participation in train-
ing programs and institutes, encounters
at more sporadic conferences and so on.
This educational aspect is often a hidden
benefit.... [I]t has value for developing
countries and it should not be, and indeed
has not been, overlooked.
W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 51.
49. On the phenomenon of small states' support of interna-
tional organizations, see Keohane, supra note 35, at 294. See aZso
W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 19, 20 ("small associate state may
seek membership in general international organizations, simultane-
ously conceding its dependence in one arena, but asserting its in-
dependence in another"). On the connection between the growth of
interdependence and the increasing number of international organi-
zations, see McDougal, Lasswell & Reisman, supra note 12 at 288
Cwhereas formerly the maximization of all values was to be found
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alliances, 50 and the like, 51 that may serve similar ends,
involve less limitation on state authority, and are fre-
quently readily available in a highly interdependent
world community.
Finally, it is hard to imagine that once it has
tasted independence, a newly independent state will
chose to delegate responsibility for the management of
even one of its functions to another state. Rather, it
seems that the option of association is more likely to
be considered by the elite of a subordinate self-deter-
mining community, at the point when the future status
of that community must be determined.5 2  In such situa-
tions, however, an option involving constraints on the
independence of a state is less likely to be preferred,
especially since a metropolitan state and its colonial
territory seem to be prime candidates for such an as-
sociation. 53  Few colonies are willing to accede to the
possibility of the continued subordination of even one
aspect of their authority to their former masters.
49. (Continued)
in freedom from encumbrance, it is increasingly appreciated that
maximization of values can now develop only through organized and
centralized and staffed decision-making structures.")
50. For a discussion of small states and alliances, see
Keohane, supra note 35, at 300-04; Olso & Zeckhauser, An Economic
Theory of Alliances, 48 Rev. Econ. Statis 266 (1966).
There is a new gloom-word in Nato: 'Denmark-
isation.' It is what happens when a small
country decices that it need not spend much
on defense because its Bigger Atlantic allies
will protect it anyway.... [T]he new mani-
festation in Denmark is disturbing because,
to some degree, it has already infected
Belgium, Holland and Norway.
Those Danish BZues, The Economist, Oct. 4, 1980, at 14.
51. In cases of security problems an additional option may be
to build an army in the concerned state with the aid of another
state.
52. It is unlikely that two states without some prior experi-
ence involving a degree of mutual dependence in some functions will
be willing to participate in a formal association. The probability
that two independent states will agree on the establishment of an
association in a market-type "meeting of the minds" is somewhat un-
realistic.
53. All currenly existing associations were established by
such participants. See cases reviewed in part VI, infra.
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IV. Associate Statehood as A Compromise Solution
Self-determination is a process 5 4 always involving
two parties as direct participants. Whenever a commu-
nity within an established entity--whether colonial or
non-colonial--asserts its right to self-determination
and claims the establishment of a new entity,55 it is
clear that two communities are going to take part in
the process and to be affected by its outcome.
Under contemporary international law, self-deter-
mining entities are offered three options. The outcome
of the process of self-determination must, therefore,
be either emergence as an independent state, association
with an independent state, or integration with an in-
dependent state. 5 6 It seems, however, that the options
54. Chen, Self-Determination as a Human Right, in Toward
World Order and Human Dignity 201-08 (M. Reisman & B. Weston, eds.
1976) (self-determination as part of more comprehensive social
process); Suzuki, Self-Determination and World Public Order:
Community Response to Territorial Separation, 16 Va. J. Int'l L.
779, 790 (1976) (process of self-determination as manifestation of
group's desire for new pattern of value effects).
55. See Chen, supra note 54 at 206-07 (discussing different
claims of self-determination, involving or not involving "estab-
lishment of new entities").
56. G.A. Res. 1541 (Annex), 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 29,
U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). See also G.A. Res. 742, 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 17) 21, 22-23, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953); W. Reisman, supra note
15, at 10 (self-determining entities are offered three options, two
of which do not involve full independence); Sohn, The Concept of
Autonomy in International Law and the Practice of the United Nations,
15 Israel L. Rev. 180, 183-185 (1980) (U.N. views on the options for
the attainment of self-government). It is noteworthy, however,
that the Special Committee on the Situation With Regard to the Imple-
mentation of the Declaration on the Granting of Independence to
Colonial Countries and Peoples, created under G.A. Res. 1654, 16 U.N.
GAOR Supp. 17, at 65, U.N. Doc. A5100 (1961) ("The Special Committee
of Twenty Four"), consistently held that the right of self-determina-
tion can be considered as genuinely realized only when independence
is attained. For criticism of the Committee's position, see Fisher,
supra note 35, at 168; Bowett, Self-Determination and Political
Rights in the Developing Countries, Am. Soc. Int'l L. Proc. 129,
134-35; Emerson, supra note 39, at 475.
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of both independence and integration represent an ap-
proach substantially distinct, in terms of the outcome
of the process of self-determination, from that of the
option of association.
Both independence and integration are "absolute"
outcomes: the process of self-determination ends either
with two separate states having no institutionalized
connection between them, or with the incorporation of
one community into the state framework of the other.
Association, on the other hand, is a "relative" out-
come. 5 7 It is not so much that both participants in-
volved in the process of self-determination continue
to be mutually connected even after the termination of
the process that is important, but rather their posi-
tions relative to each other. The associate has
realized a broad scope of independence, though not "full"
independence while the principal, though excluded from a
major portion of its former control over the associate,
still retains some of it. This relative quality of the
outcome reached under the option of associate statehood
makes this option a prime candidate for being invoked
as a solution of compromise. Each party comes out with
some net "gains" following its partial "loss."'5 8
Thus, it might be argued that the decolonization
era does not necessarily signal the exhaustion of the
situations in which the framework of associate statehood
could be applied. On the contrary. It is reasonable to
suggest that the full realization of the possibilities
of this institution lies in the future.
57. This discussion relates to processes by which entities
with a previous superordination-subordination connection establish
associations. On the unlikelihood of association being established
by entities having no former connection of that type, see note 52
supra.
58. The compromise quality of associate statehood is reflect-
ed in Reisman's reference to association as "a policy 'trade-off.'
It compromises some fundamental international policies in order to
increase returns on others." W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 114.
The quality of relativity of association is reflected in the fact
that of the three options for self-determination this is the only
one subject to continuous scrutiny by the international community.
For a review of the on-going scrutiny of association, see W. Reisman,
supra note 15, at 114,
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The principle of self-determinaton has been one of
the most vigorous forces extensively invoked in our cen-
tury. As the decolonization era winds to a close, how-
ever,the international community still faces situations
in which the application of the principle of self-deter-
mination involves severe hardships. It is in the con-
text of these difficult cases that the option of associ-
ate statehood could be applied as a solution of compro-
mise, accommodating the diverse interests involved.
Cases involving secession are prime examples of
situations requiring such delicate compromise. A signi-
ficant characteristic of many of the states that have
arisen in the current era--and of many long extant states
for that matter--is that they are heterogeneous and
still involved in a struggle for ethnic coherence. It
is clear, therefore, that in the future the internation-
Pi community will be concerned with the invocation of
the principle of self-determination in the context of
secession much more than in the colonial context. 59 It
seems reasonable to assume that many cases of secession
will involve situations in which the already-existing
state and its secessionist region will continue to be
mutually dependent. The association relationship may
be invoked as the preferred solution for settlement of
such cases. 6 0
59. Chen, supra note 54, at 239-42; Nanda, Self-Determination
in International Law, 66 Am. J. Int'l L. 321-22 (1972); Emerson,
supra note 39, at 465; Note, The Logic of Secession, 89 Yale L.J.
802, 802 (1980). For a discussion of heterogeneous long-existing
states and secession, see Rostow, "Palestinian Self-Determination":
Possible Futures for the Unallocated Territories of the Palestine
Mandate, 5 Yale Stud. World Pub. Ord. 147, 153-54 (1979) (most
states include more than one people, and the international community
is generally hostile to secession movements).
60. See W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 20. In "An Option for
Quebec," Reng L~vesque proposed that Quebec become an independent
state associated with Canada through a monetary union and a custom
union. R. Ldvesque, An Option for Quebec 42-47 (1968). Though it
is clear that this "association" is different from the one discussed
in the present article--at least with regard to the custom union--it
is interesting that L~vesque proposes institutionalized connection
with Canada in the period following secession and that he--the
exponent of secession'--emphasizes time and again the high level of
dependence existing between world participants. Id. at 39, 43, 44.
In a referendum held in Quebec on May 20, 1979, the "sovereignty-
association" proposal of Mr. Levesque was rejected by more than 59%
of the voters. See Reprieved, The Economist, May 24, 1980, at 53.
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Besides the general group of secession cases, there
currently exist some specific cases where the applica-
tion of the principle of self-determination involves
difficulties which might be alleviated through the ap-
plication of the notion of association. The West Bank
and Gaza clearly represent one of these cases, 61
V. International Policy: Associate Statehood as A
Legitimate Means for Self-Determination
Although the potential of the notion of associate
statehood extends beyond the colonial context, it is
nonetheless clear that any association established in
the foreseeable future will be evaluated by the inter-
national community in light of the criteria of legiti-
macy that have been developed in the post-World War II
era of decolonization. These criteria derive from the
general principle of self-determination. As they apply
to associate statehood, they concentrate on the associ-
ate with the intention to determine whether participa-
tion in the association has helped its people fully
realize their right of self-determination.6 2
61. Another possible case is that of the Horn of Africa. On
the Ethiopia-Eritrea and Ethiopia-Somalia problems, see Wiberg, The
Horn of Afr-tca, 16 J. Peace Research 189 (1979); G. Morrison, The
Southern Sudan and Eritrea (1971); and S. Longrigg, A Short History
of Eritrea (19.45).
62. The rise of the principle of self-determination to its
preeminent position in contemporary international law¢ is closely con-
nected with the formation of the United Nations and with numerous ac-
tions pertaining to this issue taken by the organizationts organs--
primarily, the General Assembly. There are many road-signs for that
preoccupation: U.N. Charter arts. 1(2), 55; International Covenant
on Economic, Social, and Cultural Rights, G.A. Res. 2200A, Annex, 21
U.N. GAOR Supp. (No. 16) 49, U.N. Doc. A/6316 (1966); International
Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, id., at 52-53; Declaration on
the Granting of Independence to Colonial Countries and Peoples, G.A.
Res, 1514, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 16) 66, 66-67, U.N. Doc. A/4684
(1960); The Declaration on Principles of International Law concerning
Friendly Relations and Co-operation among States in accordance with
the Charter of the United Nations, G.A. Res. 2625, (Annex) 25 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 28) 121, 123, U.N. Doc. A/8028 (1970); Principles
which should guide members in determining whether or not an obliga-
tion exists to transmit the information called for under Article 73e
of the Charter, G.A. Res. 1541, 15 U.N. GAOR, Supp, (No. 16) 29, U.N.
Doc. A/4684 (1960).
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As noted above,6 3 associate statehood is fully
recognized in contemporary international law as a legi-
timate means for self-determination. Moreover, in ad-
dition to its general recognition in principle, associ-
ation with another state has been specifically recog-
nized in practice by the General Assembly of the U.N.
as a legitimate exercise of the right of self-determi-
nation in several cases that involved the establishment
of associate statehood. 64
62. (Continued)
It is well established that the question whether a certain
community has fully realized its right of self-determination is
part of the legitimate concern of any member of the international
community. The principle of non-intervention in matters of domes-
tic jurisdiction is regarded, in this context, as being preempted
by the superior considerations that matters of self-determination,
bearing the potential for constituting a threat to international
peace and a violation of human rights, are of legitimate interna-
tional concern. For the principle of non-intervention in matters
of domestic jurisdiction, see UN. Charter Art. 2(7); McDougal &
Reisman, Rhodesia and the United Nations: The Lawfulness of In-
ternational Concern, 62 Am. J. Int'l L. 1, 14, 15 (1968); Chen &
Reisman, Who Owns Taiwan: A Search for International Title, 81
Yale L.J. 599, 648, 649 n.185 (1972). On matters of self-determi-
nation as a potential threat to international peace, see McDougal
& Reisman, supra; R. Higgins, The Development of International Law
Through the Political Organs of the United Nations 93, (1963). On
matters of self-determination as potential violation of human
rights, see McDougal & Reisman, supra, at 15, 16; W. Reisman, supra
note 15, at 10; R. Higgins, id., at 104; E. Suzuki, Self-Determina-
tion and World Public Order: Community Response to Group Formation
5, 6 (1974) (unpublished J.S.D. thesis, on file at Yale Law School
Library).
63. See text accompanying note 56, supra.
64. E.g., Cessation of the Transmission of Information under
Article 73e of the Charter in Respect of Puerto Rico, G.A. Res. 748
8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17) 25, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953)(Puerto Rico);
Communication from the Government of the Netherlands concerning the
Netherlands Antilles and Surinam, G.A. Res. 945, 10 U.N. GAOR, Supp.
(No. 19) 25, U.N. Doc. A/3116 (1955) (Surinam and The Netherlands
Antilles); Question of the Cook Islands, G.A. Res. 2064, 20 U.N.
GAOR, Supp. (No. 14) 56, U.N. Doc. A/6014 (1965) (The Cook Islands);
Question of Niue, G.A. Res. 3285, 29 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 31) 98,
U.N. Doc. A/9631 (1974) (Niue).
320 [VOL. 6
WEST BANK AND GAZA
Of course, the mere establishment of an association
is no proof that the right of self-determination has
been genuinely exercised by the people of the associate.
What is important is not the form of association, but
its content. 5 Hence, two basic indicators have been
developed for determining the lawfulness of any parti-
cular association. The first and most critical one,
which in itself is a reflection of the general basic
premise of self-determination, is "[t]he extent of the
consent, among the broad population, of the associate
to the association."6 6 The second indicator of lawful-
ness is "[t]he extent to which the association conduces
to a better fulfillment of the human (including economic
and social) rights deemed under contemporary prescrip-
tions to be minimum international standards. ''6 7
In addition, for an association to be legitimate,
there should be retained "for the peoples of the terri-
tory which is associated with an independent State the
freedom to modify the status of that territory through
the expression of their will by democratic means and
through constitutional processes." 68  The associate
should also have "the right to determine its internal
constitution without outside interference, in accordance
with due constitutional processes and the freely ex-
pressed wishes of the people.,"
69
Several criteria have been developed as guidelines
for determining whether an association is in accord with
65. W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 11.
66. Id. (emphasis in original). In the period since 1945,
the international plebiscite has become the preferred device for
ascertaining the genuine d.:sire of the population of self-determin-
ing communities. See Chen & Reisman, supra note 62, at 660-69 (dis-
cussing plebiscites in international law); H. Johnson, Self-Deter-
mination Within the Community of Nations 71-79 (history of plebis-
cite as basis for self-determination); Rappaport, supra note 35, at
157, 158 (history of U.N. verification of freedom of choice in self-
determination).
67. W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 12.
68. Principle VII(a), G.A. Res. 1541 (Annex), 15 UN. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). For a discussion of
this requirement, see text accompanying notes 149-151, infra.
69. Id., Principle VII(b).
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These demands of lawfulness. 7 0 Thus, in cases where the
associate is separate geographically and distinct ethni-
cally and/or culturally from the principal, elements of
an administrative, political, juridical, economic, or
historical nature may be taken into consideration. If
these elements are found to affect the relationship be-
tween the parties in a manner which arbitrarily places
the associate in a "position or status of subordination,"
they are held to support the presumption that the "associ-
ate" is a territory governed by the "principal," not a
territory which through the exercise of its right of self-
determination has joined voluntarily in the establishment
of an association./1
VI. International Practice With Regard to Associate
Statehood
I desired the Secretary ,. to let [the Emperor]
know, that I thought it would not become me,
who was a foreigner, to interfere with parties;
but I was ready, with the hazard of my life, to
defend his person and state against all invaders. 7 2
A. Introduction
The model of associate statehood is not a recent
innovation.7 3 Nonetheless, any new association likely to
be established in the near future will be judged in light
of the legal concepts developed and the precedents created
and recognized as legitimate in the decolonization era of
70. W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 13-15.
71. Principles IV, V, G.A. Res. 1541 (Annex), 15 U.N. GAOR,
Supp. (No. 16) 29, U.N. Doc. A/4684 (1960). Cf. Factors Indicative
of the Attainment of Independence or of Other Separate Systems of
Self-Government, G.A. Res. 742 (Annex), 8 U.N. GAOR, Supp. (No. 17)
22, U.N. Doc. A/2630 (1953). As to the relation between these two
Resolutions, see Clark, Self-Determination and Free Association--
Should the United Nations Terminate the Pacific Islands Trust?, 21
Harv. Int'l L.J. 1, 53, 73 n.387 (1980).
72. Jonathan Swift, Gulliver's Travels 38 (Case ed. 1938).
73. For a general treatment of historical examples, see L.
Oppenheim, supra note 17, at 191-96 (Republic of Andorra, Tunisia,
Morocco); D. O'Connell, supra note 15, at 379-83 (Ionian Islands,
Kuwait, Tunisia, Morocco). See also W. Reisman, supra note 15, at
10, 12 (traditional forms of association).
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the last three and a half decades, rather than according
to some venerable cases that cannot easily be reconciled
with the contemporary concept of legitimate associate
statehood.
Despite the vigor of the principle of self-determina-
tion in contemporary international law, examples of
subordinate-superordinate relationships of varying scope
exist in profusion. The subordinate entity in these
relationships often enjoys a certain degree of self-
government while management of some functions of its
government remains in the hands of the superordinate
entity. Nonetheless, a scrupulous study of these cases,
in light of contemporary international policy pertaining
to the issue of associate statehood, will reveal that the
number of cases that might be viewed as legitimate associa-
tions is relatively small. Those that do not qualify are,
it is true, based on an allocation of power in accord with
the traditional model of associate statehood; but they fail
to be "legitimate" because they lack the support of the
majority of the population of the associate.
The following review will draw on the few current
cases that may be regarded as having satisfied the de-
mands of lawfulness dictated by contemporary interna-
tional policy: the association between the United States
and Puerto Rico; 74 the association between The Netherlands
74. Puerto Rico is 75 miles east of the Dominican Republic.
The population as of 1972 was approximately 2,816,000. The associ-
ation of Puerto Rico and the United States, established in 1952, is
governed by Public Law 600, the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Act,
the United States Constitution and the Constitution of the Common-
wealth of Puerto Rico. Public Law 600 stated that the people of
Puerto Rico may organize a government pursuant to a constitution of
their own adoption. This Law was approved by a referendum held in
Puerto Rico. Following this approval, a constitutional convention
drafted a proposed constitution for Puerto Rico. This constitution
was approved in a second referendum. According to the Constitution
of Puerto Rico, any future changes in the status of Puerto Rico would
require U.S. assent. Art. 7(3). However, in a message addressed to
the General Assembly of the U.N., the President of the United States
stated that "if at any time the Legislative Assembly of Puerto Rico
adopts a resolution in favor of more complete or even absolute inde-
pendence," the President "will immediately thereafter recommend to
Congress that such independence be granted." V. Reisman, supra note
19.80]
YALE STUDIES IN WORLD PUBLIC ORDER
and The Netherlands Antilles; 7 5 the association between
74. (Continued)
15, at 43. According to Reisman,
[u]nder the precedent of the Eastern Greenland
case, the President's statement may be viewed
as a binding commitment under international
law which would supersede even a constitutionally
prescribed procedure. And as a practical matter,
it is difficult to imagine the United States re-
fusing to acknowledge and comply with a Puerto
Rican majority demand for independence.
Id. at 45. For a review of Puerto Rican national identity,
political history and economy, see id. at 22-31.
75. The Netherlands Antilles consists of five islands and
part of a sixth in the Caribbean Sea. The islands are in two
groups 500 miles apart. The population as of 1966 was approximate-
ly 210,000. In 1816, the Dutch administration was established in
the islands. Since 1865, there was a steady process of participa-
tion in the local government by the inhabitants. The culmination
of this process was the Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands
of December 1954 which is a compact negotiated and concluded by
delegations of the Netherlands, the Netherlands Antilles, and
Surinam. For an English translation of the Charter, see 5 Nether-
lands Int'l L. Rev. 107 (1958), and 5 A. Blaustein & E. Blaustein,
Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties (1976).
The Charter was approved by the Parliaments of the three countries.
Pursuant to art. 42 of the Charter, the Parliament of the Nether-
lands Antilles adopted, in 1955, the Constitution of the Netherlands
Antilles. For an English translation of the text, see 5 A. Blau.tein
& E. Blaustein, supra. The Charter does not include any provision
regarding the right of secession. However, during the negotiations
preceding the promulgation of the Charter this question engaged the
participants considerably. In a Memorandum of Understanding signed
by the parties in 1952, the right of secession was vaguely recogniz-
ed. Moreover, on the occasion of the promulgation of the Charter,
Queen Juliana of the Netherlands declared that no political partner-
ship could endure unless supported by voluntary acceptance and
fidelity of the overwhelming majority of the citizens and that pre-
venting a partner from leaving the Kingdom if it wished to do so
would be contrary to established policy. In addition, bearing in
mind that secession would necessarily mean amending the Charter, the
draftsmen of the Charter provided for a relatively flexible procedure
for its amendment. Art. 55. In any case, in 1975 Surinam seceded
from its connection with the Netherlands and the Netherlands Antilles
and became independent. The process of its secession has been peace-
ful and of mutual consent. See generally Van Panhuys, The Interna-
tional Aspects of the Reconstruction of the Kingdom of the Nether-
lands in 1954, 5 Nederlands Tijdschrift Voor Int'l Recht 1 (1958);
Bos, Surinam's Road From Self-Government to Sovereignty., 7 Netherlands
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New Zealand and the Cook Islands; 7 6 the association be-
tween New Zealand and Niue; 7 7 and the association between
75. (Continued)
Y. B. Int'l L. 131 (1976); Broderick, supra note 35, at 399, 400;
Clark, supra note 71, at 46-49; D. O'Connell, supra note 15, at
417-19; Van Reenen, Future Independence of the Netherlands Antilles
and the Warsaw Convention, 9 Netherlands Y. B. Int'l L. 27 (1978).
76. The Cook Islands comprise fifteen islands located in the
South Pacific Ocean about 1,600 miles northeast of New Zealand. They
are scattered over some 850,000 square miles, though their total land
area is only 93 square miles. Their population as of 1976 was 18,112.
The islands became a British protectorate in 1888. In 1901 they were
proclaimed part of New Zealand. Nonetheless, the residents of the
islands had no vote in New Zealand elections, paid no New Zealand
taxes and did not participate in New Zealand's social security scheme.
On the other hand, they were New Zealand citizens with free access to
New Zealand. The present legal status of the Cook Islands and their
relationship with New Zealand were determined by the Cook Islands
Constitution Act, 1964. Statutes of New Zealand, 1964, Vol. 1, No.
69. The Cook Islands Constitution, Cook Islands Constitution Amend-
ment Act, 1965, sched. 2, Statutes of New Zealand, 1965, Vol. 1, No.
2, was approved by the Legislative Assembly of the Cook Islands
following negotiations with the New Zealand Government. The form
and nature of the future status of the Cook Islands has been a major
issue in the election for that Legislative Assembly, The Constitution
of the Cook Islands includes a special procedure for the revision of
the status of the Cook Islands upon the unilateral will of the people
of the Cook Islands. Cook Islands Const. art. 41. On the eve of the
association the New Zealand Government undertook to continue its sub-
stantial financial aid to the Cook Islands. (In 1978 this aid was
about $U.S. 6 million). The people of the Cook Islands retained their
New Zealand citizenship after the establishment of the association.
For a general report on the change of status in the Cook Islands, see
P. Allen, Self-Determination in the Western Indian Ocean 40-49 (1966);
Kilbridge. The Cook Islands Constitution, 1 New Zealand U.L. Rev. 571
(1965); Stone, Self-Government in the Cook Islands 1965, 1 J. Pacific
Hist. 168 (1966); Broderick, supra note 35, at 390-92; Clark, supra
note 71, at 54-57, 72 n.382. See also Northey, Self-Determination in
the Cook Islands, 74 J. Polynesian Soc. 112 (1965) (taking a critical
view of the change in status).
77. Niue, covering an area of approximately 10 square miles, is
580 miles northeast of Rarotnnga, the main island of the Cook Islands.
Its population as of 1976 was 3,954. Niue became a British protec-
torate in 1900. In 1901 it was included within New Zealand boundaries.
After being administered as part of the Cook Islands for three years it
was placed under separate administrition in 1904. In the early 1960s
there began a process of delegation of executive authority to the
people of Niue. This process culminated in Niue's association with New
Zealand, in 1974, under the Niue Constitution Act, 1974, Statutes of
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the United Kingdom and the West Indies islands. 7 8 A
sixth instance of associate statehood is expected to
77.(Continued)
New Zealand, 1974, Vol. 2, No. 42, and the Niue Amendment Act 1974,
id. at No. 43. The association between Niue and New Zealand came
out of discussions held in 1973 by representatives of Niue under the
affirmation of the Niue Assembly and the New Zealand Government.
The Constitution of Niue provides a special procedure for the re-
vision of the status of Niue upon the unilateral will of the people
of Niue. Niue Const. art 35. The people of Niue retained their
New Zealand citizenship after the establishment of the association.
See generally T. Chapman, The Decolonization of Niue (1976).
78. The island territories, located in the Caribbean Sea north
of Trinidad and southeast of Puerto Rico are: Antigua (108 square
miles, population of 58,000); St. Kitts-Nevis (68 square miles, popu-
lation of 38,000 in St. Kitts, 50 square miles, population of 12,500
in Nevis); and St. Vincent (150 square miles, population of 86,500).
The status of the island territories and their relationship with the
United Kingdom were determined by the West Indies Act, 1967, 1967 c.
4. Originally, six associated states were established under the Act:
Antigua; Dominica; Grenada; St. Christopher (later St. Kitts), Nevis,
and Anguilla; St. Lucia; St, Vincent. In 1971 Anguilla came under
direct administration of the United Kingdom. In 1973 Grenada termi-
nated its status of association and became independent. Dominica
became independent in 1978 and St. Lucia in 1979. Constitutional
talks on independence for Antigua began in London on Dec. 4, 1980.
The West Indies Act of 1967 is the result of discussions hetween
representatives of the United Kingdom and the island territories,
including three Constitutional Conferences, held in London. The
Reports of these Constitutional Conferences, as well as the constitu-
tion of each island territory, have been approved by the legislature
of each of the island territories. The Act contains detailed provi-
sions for unilateral termination of the status of association both by
each associated state and by the United Kingdom. (West Indies Act
1967, 1967 c. 4 §§ 10, 11, sched. 2). The British Nationality Acts
1948 to 1965 have remained in force in the associated states, and
a citizen of any of these states is known as a citizen of the United
Kingdom, Associated States and Colonies. For a general discussion of
the recent changes in the status of these Caribbean island territories,
see C. O'Loughlin, Economic and Political Change in the Leeward and
Windward Islands (1968); Laing, Independence and Islands: The De-
colonization of the British Caribbean, 12 N.Y.U. J. Inttl L. & Pol'y
281 (1979); Broderick, supra note 38; Clark, supra note 71, at 60-64.
See also, Fisher, supra note 35 (focusing on Anguilla); Antigua In-
dependence Talks Q0z With a Dispute, N.Y. Times, Dec. 5, 1980,
Section 1, at 6 col. 2. (commencement of Antigua independence talks).
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commence in the near future. 7 9 It is noteworthy that
79. The parties to this agreement are the United States
and three of the four Micronesian entities currently comprising
the Trust territory of the Pacific Islands: Palau, the Federated
States of Micronesia (population as of 1977, 69,360), and the
Marshall Islands (population as of 1977, 27,096). Geographically,
these three entities comprise hundreds of islands and atolls scat-
tered across three million square miles of the Pacific Ocean be-
tween Hawaii and Guam. A Compact of Free Association was initialed
by the United States as one party and the Marshall Islands and
the Federated States of Micronesia as the other party on October
31, 1980, and by the United States and Palau on November 17, 1980.
Copy on file wit. Yale Studies in World Public Order. Under the
Compact its approval by the Micronesian party is to be expressed
in a plebiscite. The connection of association is expected to
supersede the existing Pacific Islands Trust in 1981. The Compact
provides the peoples of the Micronesian entities with some prefer-
ences over other aliens with regard to immigration to the United
States. See generally Clar%,. supra note 71; Armstrong, The Nego-
tiations for the Future Political Status of Micronesia, 74 Am. J.
Int'l L. 689 (1980); 2 States in Pacific Initial Self-Rule Pacts
With U.S., NY. Times, Nov. 2, 1980, Section 1, at 14 col. 1. For
a discussion of the problem of the termination of this association,
see note 151 infra. For a discussion of expected U.S. financial
support of its Micronesian associates, see Clark, supra at 72
n. 382.
The fourth component of the Trust Territory of the Pacific
Islands consists of the Northern Mariana Islands (population as of
1973, 14,335). In February 1975, a Covenant to Establish a Common-
wealth of the Northern Mariana Islands in Political Union with the
United States of America was concluded by the parties. The Cove-
nant was approved by the people of the Northern Marianas in a plebi-
cite held in 1975. In 1976 it was enacted by Congress into law.
Act of March 24, 1976, Pub. L. No. 94-241, 90 Stat. 263 (1976). The
Covenant is expected to enter into full force at the termination of
the Pacific Islands Trust. The legal status of the Northern
Marianas under the Covenant is not clear. Some interpreted it as
intending to bring about the integration of the Northern Marianas
with the United States. See, e.g., Note, International Law and
Dependent Territories: The Case of Micronesia, 50 Temple L.Q. 58,
66, 99 (1976) (concluding attempted integration failed); Clark,
supra note 71, at 76, 77 (concluding attempted integration failed).
Others perceived the future status of the Northern Marianas in
terms of association with the lUnited States. See, e.g., Note, Self-
Determination and Security in the Pacific, 9 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &
Pol'y 277, 296-97 (1977) (discussing ways future status resembles
free association); Note, The Marianas, The United States, and the
United Nations: The Uncertain Status of the New American Comon-
wealth, 6 Calif. W. Int'l L.J. 382 (1976) (discussing association
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the basic division of power between the associate and
the principal in all these cases is alike: the associ-
ate enjoys self-government, but the principal assumes
much of the responsibility for its defense and foreign
affairs--and, in some cases, a few additional areas. 0
79. (Continued)
status). See also Clark, supra note 71, at 75, 76 (discussing
problems arising if status is tested in terms of association).
Proponents of both approaches deny the validity of the Covenant as
a lawful realization of the right of self-determination by the
people of the Northern Marianas. One of the main reasons that
those invoking the association approach deny the Covenant's vali-
dity is the need, under the Covenant, for mutual assent for any
future modification of the status of the Northern Marianas. See
Note, Self-Determination and Security in the Pacific, 9 N.Y.U. J.
Int'l L. 277, 297 (1977); Note, The Marianas, The United States,
and the United Nations: The Uncertain Status of the New American
Commonwealth, 6 Calif. W. Int'l L.J. 382, 407 (1976); Clark, supra
note 76, at 75, 76. For a discussion of the Constitution of the
Northern Mariana Islands, see Willens & Siemer, The Constitution
of the Northern Mariana Islands: Constitutional Principles and
Innovation in Pacific Setting, 65 Geo. L.J. 1373 (1977).
80. The status of Puerto Rico as a state associated with the
United States was described by the Constitutional Convention of
Puerto Rico as "a state which is free of superior authority in the
management of its ow.n local affairs but which is linked to the
United States of America and hence is part of a political system in
a manner which is compatible with its Federal structure..." Quoted
in Broderick, supra note 35, at 398.
Article 41(1) of the Charter for the Kingdom of The Nether-
lands provides that "The Netherlands ... and The Netherlands Antil-
les conduct their internal affairs autonomously." However, "main-
tenance of the independence and the defence of the Kingdom" and
"foreign relations" are the two most important "Kingdom affairs" in
regard to which a detailed machinery for co-operation between the
parties is set forth. Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands,
arts. 3, 6-8, 10-13.
"The Cook Islands shall be self-governing." Cook Islands
Constitution Act 1964, Art. 3. However, "Her Majesty the Queen in
right of New Zealand" will retain responsibility "for the external
affairs and defence of the Cook Islands...." Id., art 5.
"Niue shall be self-governing." Niue Constitution Act 1974,
Art. 3. However, "Her Majesty the Queen in right of New Zealand"
will retain responsibility "for the external affairs and defence of
Niue," id., art. 6, and it will be "a continuing responsibility of
the Government of New Zealand to provide necessary economic and
administrative assistance to Niue." Id., art. 7.
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B. Indicia of the Relationship
1. Self-Government
In all cases of association reviewed in the pages
below the structure of the institutions of the govern-
ment of the associate and their powers are set forth in
a constitution approved by the associate. 8 1 These con-
stitutions may be amended at the will of the associate,
8 2
subject at times to limitations as to the content of such
amendment, 8 3 or to the requirement that the principal con-
cur if the amendment relates to some specified subjects.
8 4
80. (Continued)
The United Kingdom Government "shall have no responsibility
for the government of any associated state" except in regard to
"any matter which in the opinion of Her Majesty's Government in the
United Kingdom is a matter relating to defence (whether of an associ-
ated state or of the United Kingdom or of any other territory for
whose government Her Majesty's Government in the United Kingdom are
wholly or partly responsible) or to external affairs...." West Indies
Act 1967, art. 2(1).
Under the Compact of Free Association of the three Micronesian
entities the peoples of these entities will be "self-governing" with
"the capacity to conduct foreign affairs ... in their own name and
right," subject, however, to a duty to consult the Government of the
United States. On the other hand, "full authority and responsibil-
ity for security and defense matters," in or relating to the Micro-
nesian entities, is conferred upon the Government of the United
States. Compact of Free Association §§ 111, 121(a), 123(a), 311(a).
When this association comes into effect it will be the only one in
which defense competence and foreign affairs competence are divided
between the principal and the associate.
81. In all cases except that of The Netherlands Antilles, the
Constitution was also approved by the principal.
82. P.R. Const. art. VII; Charter for the Kingdom of The
Netherlands, art. 42(2) and Neth. Antilles Const. art. 149. For
English translation, see A. Blaustein & E. Blaustein, supra note 75;
Cook Islands Const. art. 41; Niue Const. art. 35; West Indies Act
1967, §§ 5(4), 5(5). As to the power of the Micronesian entities to
determine their constitutions without outside interference, see
Compact of Free Association (Preamble), supra note 79, and Clark,
supra note 71, at 73.
83. P.R. Const. art. VII § 3. See also W. Reisman, supra note
15, at 38 (requirement that such amendments be consistent with "appli-
cable provisions of the Constitution of the United States"),
84. Charter for the Kingdom of The Netherlands, art. 44; Neth.
Antilles Const. art, 149.
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Pursuant to the basic division of power between associ-
ates and principals, the executive authorities of the
associates in these cases enjoy a full range of self-
government in internal matters. 8 5 In some cases these
authorities consist only of local inhabitants elected
by the people of the associate. 86 In other cases, al-
though most members of the executive are elected by the
people of the associate, 87 the executive also includes
a Governor nominated by the Queen or King who is the
"head of state" of both the principal and the associ-
ate. 88 The function of the Governor is, however,
generally merely symbolic or at most advisory. 89
Legislatures of the associates likewise enjoy a
broad scope of authority in internal matters. 90 In
most cases they are elected by the people of the
associate91 and their legislation cannot be vetoed by
any external intervention.92 Except for matters reseTv-
ed for its sole responsibility,93 the principal is also
barred from intervention, by means of its own legisla-
tion, in the legislative process of the associate.94
85. P.R. Const. art. IV: Cook Islands Const. art, 13(1);
Niue Const. art. 2(2).
86. P.R. Const. art. 4§1; art. 6§4; Niue Const. arts. 4(1),
5, 6.
87. Cook Islands Const, arts. 13,14; Neth. Antilles Const.
arts. 11, 37, 39. For the West Indies island territories, see, e.g.,
Antigua Const. art. 62, reprinted in 3 A. Blaustein & E. Blaustein,
Constitutions of Dependencies and Special Sovereignties (1975).
88. Cook Islands Const. art. 3; Neth. Antilles Const. art.
11; Antigua Const. art. 17. See aZso Van Panhuys, supra note 75,
at 12 (discussing the connection between the King of The Netherlands
and The Netherlands Antilles); 0. Phillips & P. Jackson, Constitu-
tional and Administrative Law 273, 662-66, 681-82, 697-99 (1978)
(discussing connection between British Crown and countries within
Commonwealth).
89. Cook Islands Const. arts. 3, 5, 12, 19, 25; Neth. Antilles
Const. arts. 11, 12, 32; Antigua Const. arts. 17, 60, 69.
90. Neth. Antilles Const. art. 18; Cook Islands Const. art. 39;
Antigua Const. art, 37.
91. P.R. Const. art. 1ET §1; Neth. Antilles Const. arts. 44,
45. (See aZso art. 67 and Charter art. 46); Cook Islands Const. art.
27; Niue Const. art. 16; Antigua Const. art. 30. But see id., art. 23.
92. Cook Islands Const. art. 44; Antigua Const. art. 43. But
see Neth. Antilles Const. arts. 68-78.
93. See text accompanying notes 121-28, infra.
94, Cook Islands Const. arts. 46, 88; Niue Const. art. 36;
West Indies Act 1967 §§ 3,7.
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Associates considered here operate their own judi-
cial systems. Under some circumstances, however, a
right of appeal to the highest judicial instance of the
principal is provided to the inhabitants of every
associate. 95
2. Responsibility of the Principal for Defense
and Foreign Affairs Sectors of the Associate
a. Defense
As noted above, 9 6 in all currently existing cases
of associate statehood the sectors of defense and for-
eign affairs of the associate are left within the compe-
tence of the principal. 9 7  The general authorization to
the principal to handle these sectors of the associate
is, however, often supplemented and limited by detailed
provisions for the regulation of specific issues.
Thus, in the case of the island territories in the
West Indies referred to above, 9 8 Heads of Agreement on
Defense and External Affairs were reached between the
United Kingdom and each of the associated states prior
to the establishment of the association. 9 9 The govern-
ment of each associated state took it upon itself to
provide all facilities that might be required by the
Government of the United Kingdom for the fulfillment of
its responsibilities in defense matters, and also not
to grant access to its territories to alien forces
without the consent of the United Kingdom. These Heads
of Agreement also provided that the parties would enter
into an agreement dealing with the exercise of jurisdic-
tion over United Kingdom visiting forces and other mat-
ters normally dealt with in status of forces agreements.
95. Charter for the Kingdom of The Netherlands, art. 23;
Cook Islands Const. art. 61 (but see art. 63); Niue Const. art. 51;
Antigua Const. art. 105. See also W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 34-
35 (discussing appeals from judgments of Supreme Court of Puerto
Rico to Supreme Court of United States).
96. See text accompanying note 80 supra.
97. But see note 79 supra (discussing exception with regard
to foreign affairs competence, case of proposed association of three
Micronesian entities and United States).
98. See note 78 supra.
99. See A. Blaustein & E. Blaustein, supra note 87 (text of
the Heads of Agreement).
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Finally, it was stipulated that any United Kingdom forces
in the associated states would not be used in aid of the
civil power of any state or for any purposes other than
defense except at the request of the government of that
state. 1 00 Similarly, in the case of The Netherlands
Antilles special provisions were set forth to regulate
the declaration of a state of war in any part of The
Netherlands Antilles and the administrative and consti-
tutional measures that would have to be taken in The
Netherlands Antilles in such event.1 01
b. Foreign Affairs
The interesting feature of the delegation of for-
eign affairs competence from associates to principals
in all these cases is that in none of them is that dele-
gation absolute. Such delegation is often qualified in
100. In some cases the Heads of Agreement contain the fol-
lowing clause: "Provided that the request of the Government shall
not be necessary if at any time that Government is unable, through
circumstances beyond its control, to make a request." See, e.g.,
Heads of Agreement of St. Kitts-Nevis, art. 6, A. Blaustein & E.
Blaustein, supra note 87.
101. Charter for the Kingdom of The Netherlands, arts. 11,
30-5; Neth. Antilles Const., arts. 137, 135.
Under the Compact of Free Association initialed by the United
States and the three Micronesian entities, the United States took
upon itself to defend its associates from "attack or threats" as
"the United States and its citizens are defended." The United States
was granted the power to foreclose access to or use of the terri-
tories of the associates by military personnel or for military pur-
poses "of any third country." The United States was also granted
the option to establish and use in the territories of its associates
military areas and facilities, subject to further agreements between
the parties. The Micronesian entities took it upon themselves to
refrain from actions which the United States, after consultation
with the entities, determines to be incompatible with its authority
and responsibility for security and defense with regard to these en-
tities. The status of U.S. armed forces in the territories of its
associates is left under the Compact to a separate agreement due to
come into effect simultaneously with the Compact. Compact of Free
Association, supra note 79, §§ 311(b), 313(a), 323. See also Clark,
supra note 71, at 25-31 (review of Compact's provisions relating to
security and defense relations).
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two respects. First, only some matters of foreign af-
fairs are delegated to the principal, while others are
retained by the associate to be discharged by its own
authorities. 1 0 2 Second, even those matters of foreign
affairs which are delegated to the principal are some-
times subject to a certain procedure of co-operation
with the associate in discharging them.1 03
i. Qualified Delegat-ion of Competence
A good departure point for a discussion of the
first qualification is the case of the association be-
tween Puerto Rico and the United States. In this case,
the question of the allocation of foreign affairs compe-
tence between the parties was not decided at the estab-
lishment of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico. As Reis-
man explains, it is not helpful in this context to
analogize Puerto Rico to states of the Union, "for
Puerto Rico is not a state." 1 04 He does, nonetheless,
analyze the allocation of foreign affairs competence
between the federal government and the states in the
United States for comparative purposes.
Reisman concludes that:
[T]wo legal categories emerge with increasing
clarity. The first, 'foreign affairs', in-
cludes matters which require exclusive federal
competence; the second, which might be called
'international relations', includes matters
which do not have such egregious impacts as to
require exclusive federal competence. In the
tradition of American decentralization, these
matters are left to the States and local
governments. 105
Therefore, he contends, as a member of the American
federal system Puerto Rico must be deemed to have at
least as much international competence as a State in
the Union. Though "it cannot invade the 'foreign affairs'
area, ... it is entitled to appropriate participation in
102. See text accompanying notes 104-13 infra.
103. See text accompanying notes 114-20 infra.
104. W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 40.
105. Id. at 41, 42.
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the 'international relations' sector.,1 0
6
Delegation of foreign affairs competence, qualified
to a certain extent according to the distinction above
between matters of "foreign affairs" and matters of "in-
ternational relations," may also be discerned in the
case of the association of the United Kingdom and the
West Indies island territories. Thus, the Heads of
Agreementl 07 provide that the Government of the United
Kingdom will from time to time, by dispatch, define the
extent to which the governments of the associated states
will have authority to act in the field of external re-
lations.108
In February 1967, the United Kingdom did indeed en-
trust external relations authority to the associated
states in accordance with its obligation under this pro-
vision of the Heads of Agreement.109 Associated states
were given authority, inter alia, to apply for full or
associate membership of those U.N. Specialized Agencies
or similar international organizations of which the Uni-
ted Kingdom is itself a member; to negotiate and con-
clude bilateral or multilateral trade agreements relating
to certain defined matters; to negotiate and sign agree-
ments of purely local concern with any member of the
British Commonwealth or any British Colony in the Carib-
bean area, and agreements for financial and technical
assistance or of a cultural or scientific nature with
106. Id. at 42. After analyzing the relevant international
prescriptions and international practice, Reisman concludes that
there is nothing unusual in the notion that (1) Puerto Rico will be
a full member of the United Nations, id. at 53-63, or participate in
U.N. activities either as a non-member or with the status of observer,
id. at 64-67; (2) Puerto Rico will become a party to the Statute of
the International Court of Justice, id. at 78-79; (3) Puerto Rico
will participate in many U.N. related organizations, id. at 79-95;
(4) subject to some conditions, Puerto Rico will become a party to
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), id, at 96-98;
(5) Puerto Rico will be a member in the Hague Conference on Private
International Law, id. at 98-99, and in the Inter-American Organiza-
tions, id. at 99-103; (6) Puerto Rico will have direct association
with some multilateral treaties, id. at 105-08, and (7) Puerto Rico
will have its own quasi-diplomatic representatives in other states,
id. at 109-11.
107. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
108. See, e.g., Heads of Agreement on Defense and External
Affairs with Antigua, art. 10.
109. A draft of this entrustment was annexed to the report of
the Constitutional Conference held by the parties prior to the
establishment of the association. See note 78 supra; Broderick,
supra note 35, at 377.
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any member of the British Commonwealth and with the
U.S.A.; and to arrange or permit certain kinds of visits
by representatives of the associated states to other
countries and by representatives of other countries to
the associated states. There was, however, an explicit
stipulation in this "entrustment" that governments of
the associated states must inform the Government of the
United Kingdom prior to any exercise of this delegated
authority, and that in case of dispute between the
respective governments the view Df the latter should
prevail.1 1 0
Constraints on the competence of the principal in
the foreign affairs sector also appear in the case of
the association of The Netherlands and The Netherlands
Antilles. Under the Charter for the Kingdom of the
Netherlands, The Netherlands Antilles is given the
privilege not to be bound by "international economic and
financial agreements" concluded by The Netherlands,Ill
the power to initiate such agreements with a power
binding only on itself,ll2 and some power to accede to
membership in international organizations.ll 3
ii. The Requirement of Co-operation
Between the Parties
In the cases of the association of New Zealand with
the Cook-Islands and Niue, the general responsibility of
New Zealand for the external affairs of its associates is
qualified by a duty to consult the associates before dis-
charging this duty. Thus, under the Cook Islands Consti-
tution Act of 1964, the responsibilities of New Zealand
for the external affairs of the Cook Islands ought to be
"discharged after consultation by the Prime Minister of
New Zealand with the Premier of the Cook Islands.-
114
Likewise, under the Niue Constitution Act of 1974, the
110. See, e.g., Draft Dispatch annexed to the Report of
Antigua Constitutional Conference 1966, A. Blaustein & E. Blaustein,
supra note 87.
111. Charter for the Kingdom of the Netherlands, art. 25(l).
112. Id. art. 26,
113. Id. art. 28.
114. Cook Islands Constitution Act 1964, supra note 76, art. 5.
See also Clark, supra note 71, at 55-58 (discussing allocation of
foreign affairs competence between parties).
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responsibilities of New Zealand for the external affairs
of Niue ought to be discharged "after consultation he-
tween the Prime Minister of New Zealand and the Premier
of Niue, and in accordance i ith the policies of their
respective Governments.",115
The Heads of Agreement relating to the allocation
of defense and foreign affairs competence between the
United Kingdom and its associated states provide that
the government of the United Kingdom would consult the
governments of the associated states before entering
into "international obligations" with respect to them.116
The Charter for the Kingdom of The Netherlands pro-
vides that The Netherlands Antilles will be consulted in
the preparation of treaties with other states or with
international organizations which affect itll7 and in
the performance of treaties which affect it and which are
binding on it.118 The Netherlands Antilles is also given
the authority to appoint a special representative to
participate in deliberations of the Government of The
Netherlands relating to matters of foreign relations
which affect The Netherlands Antilles.ll9 If this repre-
sentative has "serious objections" to the preliminary
opinion of the Government in any such matter, he may
request further deliberations, in which representatives
of both governments participate, for the final determina-
tion of the issue.12B
115. Niue Constitution Act 1974, supra note 77, art. 8, The
same limitation applies to the responsibility of New Zealand for the
defense of Niue and to New Zealand's responsibility to provide
necessary economic and administrative assistance to Niue.
116. Sees e.g., Heads of Agreement with Antigua, art. 9
117. Charter for the Kingdom of The Netherlands, arts. 27,
24(1). The Charter provides that such treaties should be submitted
to the Legislative Council of The Netherlands Antilles and that in
some cases The Netherlands Antilles may require a special procedure
for approving the treaty.
118. Id. art. 27.
119. Id. arts. 3(l)(b), 7, 8(1), 10, 11, See also Van Panhuys,
supra note 75, at 12 (participation of representative of Netherlands
Antilles in deliberations of Netherlands Government).
120. Id. arts. 12(2)-12(5).
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3. The Principal's Power to Legislate for
the Associate
The delegation of responsibility from associates
to principals in the sectors of defense and foreign af-
fairs is often accompanied by the grant of authorization
to principals to assume some legislative power for their
associates in matters which are within the scope of their
responsibility, subject, in some cases, to a requirement
of co-operation with the associate.
In the case of Puerto Rico and the United States,
Article 9 of the Puerto Rican Federal Relations Actl2l
reserves for the Congress of the United States wide
legislative authority for Puerto Rico. It seems, how-
ever, that this authority must be used subject to the
general framework of power allocation between Puerto
Rico and the United States.1 2 2 Hence, it is in matters
of "foreign affairs" and defense--which should be regarded
in any case as areas of exclusive federal competence--
that the United States is furnished with appropriate
power to legislate for Puerto Rico.
The Charter for the Kingdom of The Netherlands pro-
vides The Netherlands with special authority to intervene
in both the legislation and the administration of The
Netherlands Antilles in cases where legislative or admin-
istrative measures there conflict with an international
arrangement or with foreign relations or defense interests
of The Netherlands, or in the event that any organ in The
Netherlands Antilles does not adequately perform its
duties as required in pursuance of an international agree-
ment.1 2 3
The West Indies Act of 1967 enables the extension of
any Act of the Parliament of the United Kingdom to the as-
sociated states if that Act provides that it thus extends
and that it is required so to extend "in the interests of
the responsibilities of Her Majesty's Government in the
121. 48 U.S.C. §§ 731-916 (1976).
122. W. Reisman, supra note 15, at 36.
123. Charter for the Kingdom of The Netherlands, arts. 50, 51.
"Such powers . . . are of course supposed to be wielded only in
exceptional cases... " Van Panhuys, supra note 75, at 14.
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United Kingdom relating to defence and external af-
fairs. '" 1 2 4 Likewise, where it appears to be in the in-
terests of the responsibilities of the United Kingdom
Government relating to defense and external affairs
that a change be made in the law of an associated
state, the Queen is authorized to make "such provision
as appears to Her Majesty be appropriate," including,
in case of war or other emergency, a provision deroga-
ting from the provisions of the constitution of th,
state relating to "fundamental rights and freedoms, by
Order in Council, as part of the law of an associated
state.1 2 5 These provisions should, however, be read in
light of the Heads of Agreement, 1 2 6 which establish a
detailed procedure for consultation between the Govern-
ment of the United Kingdom and the government of the per-
tinent associated state prior to the former's exercise of
this legislative power. It should be noted, however,
that the government of the associated state cannot veto
the exercise of this legislative power,1 2 7
Under the Constitution of the Cook Islands and the
Constitution of Niue, the Parliament of New Zealand may
extend its Acts to become part of the law of the Cook
124. West Indies Act 1967 §3(2).
125. Id. art. 7(2).
126. See text accompanying note 99 supra.
127. See, e.g., Heads of Agreement with Antigua, art. 13.
Under the Heads of Agreement with the West Indies island territories,
the governments of the associated states undertook to take all steps,
including legislative ones, required by the United Kingdom Govern-
ment to secure the fulfillment of Commonwealth or international
obligations or responsibilities of the United Kingdom Government and
those steps required in the interest of good relations between the
associated state or the United Kingdom and another country. See, e.g.,
Heads of Agreement with Antigua, art. 11. In addition, the govern-
ments of the associated states took it upon themselves not to intro-
duce or support legislation inconsistent with the above terms with-
out the consent of the United Kingdom Government. See., e.g., Heads
of Agreement with Antigua, art. 12. Moreover, the West Indies Act
of 1967 provides that the legislature of an associated state shall
not have power to make any law whereby the government of that state,
subject to the consent of the United Kingdom Government, would be
authorized or required to conduct any external affairs or whereby the
government of that state would be authorized or required to interfere
with the conduct by the United Kingdom Government of defense or ex-
ternal affairs. West Indies Act of 1967, sched. 1, arts. 4(3)(a),
4 (3) (b).
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Islands and Niue. Such extension should, however, be
requested and consented to by the Legislative Assembly
of the Cook Islands and the Niue Assembly, respectively,
and it should be expressly declared in such an Act that
the Government of the Cook Islands or the Niue Assembly
has requested and consented to the enactment of that
Act.1 28
VII. Associate Statehood for the West Bank and Gaza
A. The Basic Interests of the Parties
Arab nationalism in Palestine as well as in other
places in the Middle East began to manifest itself at
the end of the nineteenth century. Since the 1920s a
separate Palestinian national movement could be dis-
tinguished on the Middle East scene. This movement,
though strongly correlated with notions of Pan-Arabism
for many years, 1 2 9 advocated the establishment of an
128. Cook Islands Const, art. 46; Niue Const. art, 36. In
the case of Niue, subordinate legislation of New Zealand may also
be extended to Niue as well, id. art. 36. The Governor-General of
New Zealand may, from time to time, and subject to similar limita-
tions applying to the Parliament of New Zealand, issue regulations
for the Cook Islands. Cook Islands Const. art, 88. In the case of
the proposed association of the three Micronesian entities and the
United States, as in the cases of the Cook Islands and Niue, the
associates would not be subject to the legislative power of the
principal. Compact of Free Association, supra note 79, §171. See
Clark, supra note 71, at 73.
129. In a discussion of the nationalism of the Arabs
of Palestine, the question can properly be
raised, is it 'Palestinian-Arab,' or Arab-
Palestinian' .... Since the emergence of strong
nationalist sentiment among Palestine Arabs
they have received backing from leaders in
the surrounding Arab states; Palestinian goals
have been linked with those of other nationalist
movements; the more fervently they articulate
their own goals the more they seem inextricably
linked with the broader aspirations of Arab
nationalism. However, since 1967 the Pales-
tinians have developed a nationalist credo that
is distinct, that differentiates, but does not
separate them from other Arab nationalists.
Peretz, The Historical Background of Arab Nationalism in Palestine,
in The Palestine State 3, 3 (R. Ward, D. Peretz & E. Wilson eds. 1977).
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independent Arab state in Palestine.1 3 0 In November
1947, following the General Assembly Resolution calling
for the partition of Palestine into an Arab state and a
Jewish state,1 31 the realization of this goal, though
only in part of Palestine, seemed closer than ever be-
fore. As noted above,13 2 however, the Palestinians and
Arabs rejected the notion of partition. This rejection
led to their massive offensive against the Jewish com-
munity in Palestine.
The Palestinian national movement came out of this
war shattered, its people dispersed to several Arab
states as well as Israel, and Palestine itself divided
between Transjordan, Egypt, and Israel. This eclipse
and dormancy of the Palestinian national movement con-
tinued for some twenty years.13 5 It was the Six Day
War of 1967--which brought the areas of the West Bank
and Gaza under Israeli military administration--that
gave the movement the impetus to revive, although the
first signs of this revival could be discerned in the
middle of the 1960s. The Palestine Liberation Organiza-
tion CPLO) has emerged at the fore of the leadership of
the movement. In the last decade, this organization,
voicing the Palestinian claim for self-determination in
world arenas, has gained world-wide recognition as the
129. (Continued)
See generally Y. Porath, The Emergence of the Palestinian-Arab
National Movement 1918-1929 49-50, 62-63 (1974); text accompanying
note 166 infra.
130. See Lesch, The Palestinian-Arab Nationalist Movement
under the Mandate, in W. Quandt, F. Jabber & A. Lesch, The Politics
of Palestinian Nationalism 5-42 (1973); Porath, supra note 129, at
31-122; Peretz, supra note 129, at 3-5, 9, 10, 15, 16, 20; E. Said,
The Question of Palestine 117 (Vintage Books ed. 1980). See generally
A. Kayyali, Palestine, A Modern History (giving Arab viewpoint);
Rouleau, The Palestinian Quest, 53 For. Aff. 264 (1975).
131. G.A. Res. 181, 2 U.N. GAOR, 131-32, U.N. Doc. A/519
(1947).
132. See Part I supra.
133. For Palestinian history in the period 1948-1967, see
Peretz, supra note 129, at 23-43; Quandt, Political and Military
Dimehsions of Contemporary Palestinian Nationalism, in W. Quandt,
F. Jabber & A. Leach, supra note 130, at 43, 45-51.
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representative of the Palestinian people. 1 3 4 In the
seven years since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, this claim
has focused increasingly on the areas of the West Bank
and Gaza--the loci of the greatest Palestinian popula-
tion in the Middle Eastl 35-'with the demand for estab-
lishment of a Palestinian state in these areas.1 3 6
134. For a concise review of recognition of PLO, see Kassim,
The Palestine Liberation Organization"s Claim to Status: A Juridical
Analysis Under International Law, 9 Den. J. Int'l L. & Polty 1, 19-22,
29, 30 (1980). For more general treatment, see Perlmutter, A Race
Against Time, 57 For. Aff. 987, 997 (1979) (PLO "is now a well-estab-
lished political structure, legitimized in 1974 by the Arab states in
Rabat, and recognized by over a hundred U.N. members"); Stone,
Palestinian Resolution: Zenith or Nadir of the General Assembly, 8
N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. & Pol'y 1 (1975) (discussing 1974 "Palestinian
Resolution" of U.N. General Assembly); Mentioning the Unmentionable.,
The Economist, June 21, 1980, at 13; Nuances, Nuances, The Economist,
Sept. 15, 1979, at 54; Europe Plays Now-You-See-It-Now-You-Don"t With
the PLO, The Economist, Aug. 25, 1979, at 33, 34. Hut see Rostow,
supra note 59, at 151-52. It should be noted, however, that those
recognizing the PLO as the representative of the Palestinian people
represent a broad and varied spectrum of concepts as to the future
status of the West Bank and Gaza.
135. According to Israel's Ministry for Foreign Affairs, as
of 1974, 500,000 of a total of 2.3 million Palestinians lived on the
West Bank and 400,000 in Gaza. See Mishal, Jordanian and Israeli
Policy on the West Bank., in The Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan and the
West Bank 210, 210 (A. Sinai & A. Pollack eds., 1977). According to
PLO estimates, 654,000 Palestinians lived on the West Bank and
500,000 in the Gaza in the same year as part of a total Palestinian
population of 3.3 million. Id. According to Said there are now be-
tween 3.5 million and 4 million Palestinians, of whom I million
reside in the West Bank and Gaza. Said, supra note 130, at 115. On
the "numbers game" with regard to the problem of Palestinian refugees,
see M. Reisman, The Art of the Possible 58-60 (1970). ("The 'numbers
game' can be used to minimize one's own responsibility for others or,
alternately, to magnify the responsibility of one's adversary. It
is thus not surprising that Israelis have tended to shrink the number
of refugees and Arabs have tended to bloat it.") Id. at 60.
136. "On occasion after occasion the PLO stated its willing-
ness to accept a Palestinian state in the West Bank and Gaza. Two
meetings of the [Palestine] National Council, in 1974 and again in
1977, committed the whole national community to this idea, and with
the idea, an implicit recognition of Israel as a neighbor." Said,
supra note 130, at 224. See also id. at 124, 125, 161, 169, 175, 176,
178, 227. Said is a member of the Palestine National Council. For an
eloquent expression of the Palestinian claim for a state in the West
Bank and Gaza, see Khalidi, Thinking the Unthinkable: A Sovereign
Palestinian State, 56 For. Aff. 695 (1978). See also Waltzing Round A
Formula, The Economist, July 14, 1979, at 54 ("Mr Arafat repeated to
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Ever since its birth, the major problem faced by
Israel has been to secure its existence. Surrounded on
three sides by hostile Arab states, Israel has experi-
enced war five times in thirty-two years, and thousands
of terrorist raids in the interstices. For many years,
Israel's main security concern was for its southern
flank, where the Egyptian army, considered to be the
strongest Arab army, was stationed. Nonetheless, Israel
has always been highly sensitive to the peril of war
from the east as well.
One look at the topography of the West Bank and
Israel explains this sensitivity. The West Bank, a
mountainous area,1 37 divides Israel into two halves con-
nected by a sort of a "corridor." This corridor extends
mainly at sea level between the West Bank and the Medi-
terranean Sea. Its width at one point does not exceed
nine miles. Not only does that "corridor" comprise both
the most densely populated and most industrialized area
in Israel, but it also contains the most important com-
munication roads in the country.1 3 8 Thus, the areas of
the West Bank clearly have the potential to serve as a
base for launching a fatal military strike against Israel.
In recent years, moreover, armament of the Jordanian and
Iraqi armies has increased rapidly and massively. Conse-
quently, the strategic importance for Israel of the Judea
and Samaria mountains and the Jordan valley of the West
Bank is coming more and more to be conceived of in a some-
what novel context: as a buffer and a barrier against any
military attack launched from outside these areas.1 3 9
136. (Continued)
Mr Kreisky and to Mr Brandt . . . the formula that the PLO is pre-
pared to establish a state on any liberated territory. This is held
to imply, in a rather negative way, that the Palestinians are not
still insisting on a single state for the whole of Palestine, and are
therefore also accepting the need to coexist with Israel.")
137. 1021m at its highest point.
138. Allon, Israel: The Case For Defensible Borders, 55 For.
Aff. 38, 41, 42, 44, 46 (1976); Note, Demilitarization as an Instru-
ment for Middle East Peace, 14 Va. J. Int'l L. 267, 289, 290 (1974).
139. The West Bank is, therefore, important to Israel both for
the denial of access to it by hostile forces and for blocking hostile
forces from Israel. See text accompanying note 41 supra. For a sur-
vey of the evolution and development of the Israeli political-military
doctrine, see M. Handel, Israel's Political-Military Doctrine (1973).
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Any solution for the West Bank and Gaza will have to
take into account and reconcile the two main competing
interests that relate to these areas: the Palestinian
claim for the realization of their right of self-deter-
mination in these areas, and Israelts profound security
interest there. Any attempt to solve the problem of
these areas that ignores either of these interests is
doomed to fail. 1 4 0
B. The Proposal: Two Options of Association
Whereas it is relatively easy to divine the basic
principles of the Israeli defense interest in the West
Bank, it is mere speculation, at the moment, to predict
the course of the Palestinian aspirations in regard to
these areas. As noted above,1 41 the principle of self-
140. Indeed, these concerns of the two parties directly
affected are explicitly expressed in the Framework for Peace in
the Middle East and might be regarded, without exaggeration, as the
two principal foundations on which this accord is based.
[The transitional arrangements] should give
due consideration to both the principle of
self-government by the inhabitants ... and to
the legitimate security concerns of the parties
involved. [The negotiations on the final status
of the West Bank and Gaza] will resolve, among
other matters, the location of the boundaries
and the nature of the security arrangements.
The solution from the negotiations must also
recognize the legitimate rights of the Pales-
tinian people and their just requirements ....
All necessary measures will be taken and provisions
made to assure the security of Israel and its
neighbors during the transitional period and beyond.
Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 17 Int'l Legal Mat. at 1467,
1468 (1978).
141. See text accompanying notes 56, 66 supra. It is note-
worthy that the only association established thus far following a
plebiscite on the territory of the associate is that of Puerto Rico
and the United States. Under the Compact of Free Association con-
cluded between the United States and the three Micronesian entities,
a plebiscite is supposed to be held in each of them for the approval
of the association. Compact of Free Association, supra note 79,
§§ 411, 412.
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determination furnishes any self-determining community
with three legitimate options for self-determination and
dictates that the decision as to the preferred one be
made by the "broad population" of that community itself.
Before the true will of the population of the West Bank
and Gaza is authoritatively verified, any claim as to
its nature is therefore somewhat dubious. Moreover, if
the schedule of the Framework for Peace in the Middle
East is followed, a transitional period of five years
has to pass before the moment for Palestinian decision
comes.1 42
If we assume, however, that the Palestinian aspira-
tions relate to some separate Palestinian statehood in
the West Bank and Gaza, in order to accommodate both in,
terests relating to these areas, the authority of any
such state will inevitably have to be qualified by the
Israeli defense interest in the West Bank. If a Pales-
tinian state is established in the West Bank and Gaza,
therefore, this shoul be done within the framework of
associate statehood.14 3 The model of association--the
142. See note 6 supra. At the time of writing no date had
been fixed for the beginning of this five-year period.
143. For a proposal calling for the establishment of a
Palestinian state in the West Bank, containing the possibility that
this state would be associated with Israel (or with Jordan or with
both), see M. Reisman, supra note 135, at 51. See also W. Reisman,
supra note 15, at 20. Cf. Allon, supra note 138, at 44-47, which
recommends Israeli control over the zone lying between the Jordan
river and the Judea and Samaria mountains, leaving almost all the
West Bank under Arab rule, and a corridor from west to east, under
Arab sovereignty, connecting the West Bank to the East Bank. This
proposal, known as the "Allon Plan," was never officially adopted
by the Israeli Governments headed by the Labour Party until 1977.
The settlement plan of these governments, however, suited the Allon
Plan to a great extent. Another major Israeli approach to the problem
of the West Bank until 1977 was identified with Moshe Dayan. Whereas
the Allon Plan is based on a territorial division of the West Bank,
Dayants approach centered on the notion of functional division. It
envisaged a joint Arab-Israeli rule over the West Bank, leaving some
sectors relevant to this area for Israeli management and others for
Arab management. It is not coincidental that Dayan served for more
than two years as Foreign Minister for the Israeli government headed
by the Likud Party, whose plan for the West Bank has been based on the
notion of "autonomy." See also Peretz, Forms and Projections of a
Palestine Entity, in The Palestine State 81-82, 93 (R. Ward, D. Peretz
& E. Wilson eds. 1977) (discussing Allon Plan and Dayan's approach);
Rubinstein, The Third-State Pitfalls in The Hashemite Kingdom of Jor-
dan and West Bank 278-79 (A. Sinai & A. Pollack eds., 1977) (demili-
344 IVOL. 6
"compromise solution" for "difficult cases" 1 4 4 _-is the
one with the greatest potential to satisfy both the
Palestinian aspirations for self-determination in the
West Bank and Gaza and the security interest of Israel
in the same areas and to reconcile them with each other.
This association of a Palestinian state established in
the West Bank and Gaza with Israel would entail vesting
Israel with the sole responsibility for the defense
sector of that state. Of course, that means that no




tarized West Bank comprising part of greater Arab unit); Note, supra
note 138, at 289-95 (demilitarization of Ifest Bank); Murphy, supra
note 4, at 932-38 (strategic-area trusteeship over West Bank possibly
administered by Israel; neutralization of the West Bank).
144. See text accompanying notes 54-61, supra.
145. If this proposed association is implemented, one could
argue that in fact a double international servitude has been created
by the parties for the benefit of Israel. The main elements of such
an argument could be the following: (1) The usual case of interna-
tional servitude involves only a defined portion of the territory of
the grantor state. Nonetheless, servitudes encompassing all the
territory of the grantor state are not inconceivable. F. Vali, supra
note 18, at 309, 331-34. (For a solution of association envisioning
the West Bank and Gaza as comprising part of a greater unit, see text
accompanying notes 146-48, infra-l (2) As it is the general rule
that the authority of a state is confined to its territory, every
limitation on the function of a state, created when an association
is established, means a limitation on the authority of that state
with regard to all its territory. When a functional limitation re-
lates to the defense sector and the "territorial element," see note
18 supra, relates to the territory of both the associate and the
principal, the distinction between the functional limitation (expres-
sed in the concept of association) and the territorial limitation (ex-
pressed in the concept of international servitude) is in fact blurred.
In that case, the functional limitation is actually a territorial one
relating to the whole territory of the associate. (3) If in a par-
ticular case all the elements of international servitude exist, an
international servitude ought to be recognized even without the ex-
press use of that term by the parties. In most treaties creating an
international servitude the term "servitude" is avoided. H. Reid,
supra note 18, at 14.
[Therefore,] in every case where a right of
a conspicuously territorial character has
been established one has to presume that the
intention of the parties was to create an
absolute right, unless there is sufficient
evidence to prove the contrary. This terri-
torial and absolute character is especially
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145. (Continued)
demonstrated in cases where the right has
been accorded as the consideration for terri-
toral concessions, whiere it coincides with
the drawing of the Boundary line, when it has
been established to . . . counterbalance a
strategic inferiority, in brief, whenever it
is apparent that a right has been created in
favour of a State ton which it could rely.'
F. Vali, supra note 18, at 313, 314. (4) Consequently, association
based on the delegation of the defense sector of the associate could
be analytically perceived, under certain situations-i.e, when the
"territorial element" exists-as creating a double international
servitude: a positive-military servitude under which the grantee
state is authorized to take certain actions within the territory of
the grantor state, and a negative military servitude under which the
grantor state takes it upon itself not to militarize its territory.
See H. Reid, supra note 18, at 190-203, (positive and negative mili-
tary servitudes). See also F. Vali, supra note 18, at 263-72 and
331 n. 16 (discussing negative military servitudes and negative
military servitude relating to whole territory of Luxembourg). (5)
Moreover, in the case of Israel and the West Bank and Gaza, the con-
cept of international servitude could be based on mutuality. It is
most probable that if the West Bank and Gaza comprise a separate unit
they would both be grantees of an international servitude of the type
of right of transit to which Israel would be subject. For a treat-
ment of this type of international servitude, see F. Vali, supra note
18, at 107-24; D. O'Connell, supra note 15, at 606-07.
A major difference, however, between association based on
the delegation of the defense sector and a double military servitude
of the type described above is that in the case of association the
principal is made subject to a duty to take care of the defense of
the associate, whereas such a relationship does not exist between the
grantee and the grantor in the case of international servitude. This
difference seriously undercuts the argument set out above. Indeed, in
the context of the West Bank and Gaza the concept of "double servitude"
is an imbalanced one. It creates a situation under which Israel has
all the security benefits with regard to the West Bank and Gaza, where-
as these areas are left without an army of their own and without Is-
rael's obligation to take care of their defense.
Nonetheless, the "double servitude" argument is important from
another aspect. The main feature of international servitudes, dis-
tinguishing them from conventional arrangements, 2 D. O'Connell, State
Succession in Municipal Law and International Law 20 (1967); Esgain,
supra note 18, at 56, 57, 61, is that international servitude, being a
"real" (or dispositive) right, withstands any changes in the sovereignty
over the territory of the servient territory. D. O'Connell, supra, at
1, 3, 14, 20, 23, 231-33, 268; 0. Udokang, Succession of New States to
International Treaties 327-30 (1972); F. Vali, supra note 18, at 320-22;
cf. Esgain, supra note 18, at 55-57 (identifying and criticizing tradi-
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As noted above,1 4 6 it might well be that the
Palestinians choose to realize their right of self-deter-
mination through the third legitimate option available
under contemporary international law: integration with
an independent state. Although at the moment this does
not seem too practical a possibility, -under certain cir-
cumstances the Palestinians might choose integration with
the East Bank of Jordan. Since the solution of associ-
ate statehood for the West Bank and Gaza is an adequate
response to the genuine interests of the concerned par-
ties, however, it seems that, even if the Palestinians
would prefer integration for their self-determination,
associate statehood is still a feasible solution for the
West Bank and Gaza.
If the West Bank and Gaza were to integrate with
the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan, it would most likely be
on a federal basis.1 47 In that case, application of the
145. (Continued)
tional views). Though international servitudes constitute the clear-
est example of rights immune from subsequent changes of sovereignty,
these are not the only rights to enjoy this status. Every
"real" right is likewise immune from subsequent changes of sovereign-
ty over the territory to which it relates. It is clear, however,
that association between Israel and the West Bank and Gaza, as pro-
posed herein, being clearly based on a "territorial element," would
create for Israel "real" rights with regard to the West Bank and Gaza.
See D. O'Connell, supra, at 13, 14; 2Q, 231-33 (discussing real rgLgh"t
in context of state succession); 0. Udokang, supra, at 327-30 (dis-
cussing real rights in context of "dispositive treaties"). Hence, if,
for instance, the West Bank and Gaza, while being associated with
Israel, opt for integration with the East Bank, Israel's rights under
the association arrangement would remain unaltered. See also Vienna
Convention on Succession of States in Respect of Treaties, UN. Doc.
A/Conf. 80/31, arts, 12, 31 (1978), reprinted in 72 Am. J. Iattl L.
971 (1978).
146. See text accompanying note 56 supra.
147. In an address delivered in March 1972 before Jordanian
and Palestinian dignitaries, King Hussein disclosed his plan to re-
form the structure of his kingdom. The basic features of the plan
were that the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would become a United Arab
Kingdom consisting of two regions connected on a federal basis: the
Region of Palestine and the Region of Jordan. Address by King Hussein
to Jordanian and Palestinian Dignitaries on March 15, 1972, Concerning
Basic Principles of a Plan to Establish a United Arab Kingdom of
Palestine and Jordan, reprinted in 2 J. Moore, The Arab-Israeli Con-
flict 1128 (1974). The plan (later referred to as the "Federation
Plan") was devised partly in an effort to curb trends toward separatism
which had increased in the 1¢est Bank after "Black September" of 1970
and, in addition, to strengthen the Hashemite hold in the West Bank
in the municipal elections of 1972. The Arab--especially the Palestin-
ian--response to the plan has generally been negative. Nonetheless,
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solution of association would mean that it was the
Kingdom that would be associated with Israel, in the
sense that the aspects of its defense sector relating
to its components west of the Jordan River, namely the
West Bank and Gaza, would be Israel's responsibility.
Likewise, if the West Bank and Gaza were to form a
unitary state with the East Bank, the solution of asso-
ciation could be applied, following a similar division
of competence between that state and Israel.1 4 8
One requirement of contemporary international law
relating to the lawfulness of associate statehood, how-
ever, might frustrate any attempt to apply the model of
association as a solution for the problem of the Vest
Bank and Gaza in line with the above proposals, This
requirement is that the arrangement of association would
retain "for the peoples of the territory which is asso-
ciated with an independent state the freedom to modify
the status of that territory,.. .,,149 If read literally,
it might be argued that this requirement vests in the
associate the power to dissolve the framework of associ-
ation unilaterally and to opt for "full" independence--
i.e., free from the former control of the principal--at
any time after the establishment of the association,
It is clear that Israel would not be ready to enter any
arrangement of association the termination of which
could be imposed on it at any future time without its
consent.
It seems, however, that it would be a sound argu-
ment to claim that not all contemporary criteria of law-
fulness relating to associate statehood stand on the
same level. The paramount requirement is that the asso-
ciation be consented to by the broad population of the
147. (Continued)
Jordanian officials return to the plan from time to time, talking
about some future federal connection between the West Bank and the
East Bank. See Z. Elpeleg, King Hussein's Federation Plan--Genesis
and Reaction (1977, Hebrew). See also Bailey, Changing Attitudes
Toward Jordan in the West Bank, 32 Ifidd, E.J. 155, 160-62 (1978);
Black,' Jordan Waits in the W-ngs,98 New Statesman 408 (Sept. 21,
1979). ("Hussein is dusting off his old confederation [sic] plan.")
148. It is noteworthy that, in early November 1980, the
platform committee of Israel's Labor Party adopted a position cal-
ling for a Jordanian-Palestinian state in the East Bank as well as
in the densely inhabited parts of the West Bank and Gaza, with the
possibility that this state be headed by a member of the PLO.
IsraeZi Party"s Jordan Plan Stirs Debate, N.Y. Times, Nov. 10, 19.80,
at A3.
149. See text accompanying note 68, supra.
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associate. All other qualifications, including the one
relating to the associatets power to modify its status
at a late stage, should be applied subject to this
main requirement. This argument applies a fortiori
where associate statehood is utilized as a compromise
solution to accommodate conflicting interests in "dif-
ficult cases" of self',determination,150 where world
order requires application of the utmost creativity and
flexibility in designing a solution. In such exception-
al cases, rejection of the solution above means that
the international community, is going to lose a major
instrument for affording self-determination while simul-
taneously reducing tension and threats of violence.
Moreover, it seems that in the particular case of
the Vest Bank and Gaza the parties to the association
could fairly easily devise an arrangement satisfying the
status-modification requirement while providing their
agreement with endurance. For instance, upon the mutual
consent of the parties, the Palestinian party, on the
eve of establishment of the association, could make use
of its power of status modification and proclaim its
decision to opt for independence starting fifty years
from that time. Such a device could be acceptable to
Israel, as well as wholly satisfactory even to the most
severe contemporary requirements of lawfulness relating
to associate statehood.lS1
150. See text accompanying notes 54-61 supra,
151. Under the Compact of Free Association initialed hy the
United States and the three Micronesian entities, all the provisions
of the Compact relating to security and defense matters will be bind-
ing for a period of at least 15 years, unless terminated earlier by
mutual agreement. Moreover, if the Compact is terminated unilater-
ally after that period by any of the associates, the specific arrange-
ments for the establishment and use by the United States of military
areas and facilities in the territories of the associate states as
well as the military operating rights of the United States therein
will survive. Compact of Free Association, supra note 79, § 441-454,
321(a), 323. The effect of the 15-year limitation was described by
one scholar as follows:
The survival of title III [relating to security,
and defense relations] in the event of
Micronesian termination of the Compact pro-
tects United States interests by limiting
the unilateral right of termination so far
as that part of the Compact is concerned.
This guarantee . . . will give the -nited
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C. Evaluation of the Proposal
There are two major possibilities for associate
statehood as a solution to the problem of the West Bank
and Gaza. One, the paradigmatic case for association
in this context, is an association between a Palestinian
state established in these areas and the State of Is-
rael. The other is an association between a state con-
sisting of the West Bank, Gaza, the East Bank,1 52 and
the State of Israel.
These two solutions ought to be evaluated within
three contexts and in light of two criteria. The first
context for evaluation is the bilateral onei the con-
flict between the Jewish national movement as expressed
in the state of Israel on the one hand, and the Pales-
tinian national movement on the other. The second con-
text is the regional onet the effects of the proposed
solutions on neighboring countries in the Middle East.
Broadest of all is the global context.
The first of the two criteria that ought to apply
to any evaluation of these two solutions is their feasi-
bility, i.e., the chances for the realization of these
solutions, given the relevant political conditions and
the interests of the parties directly involved (Israel,
the Palestinians, Jordan). The second criterion, which
seems to be the dominant one, is the long-run effects
of each solution within each of the three above-mentioned
contexts. This criterion ought to be the one to guide
151. (Continued)
States a substantial negotiating advantage
in any future discussions, and will make
unilateral termination by the Micronesian
entities difficult to conceive of in practice.
Clark, supra note 71, at 35, n. 211. Moreover, in spite of the severe
limitations imposed on the Micronesian power of status modification,
Clark's conclusion is that in this case "the requirementa of Princi-
ple VII of Resolution 1541 appear to be met." Id. at 74.
It is interesting to note, in this context, that according
to one view even an international servitude "need not he one which
has been established in perpetuity. It is quite conceivable that a
right in foreign territory will only be created for a definite num-
5er of years, as so often happens, It still may be a territorial
and absolute right even if its duration has been limited for a num-
ber of years...." F. Vali, supra note 18, at 311-12. Cf. H. Reid,
supra note 18, at 19-21 (insistence on element of permanency in in-
ternational servitudes); Esgain, supra note 18, at 47, 82, 83 (per-
manency is essential element in concept of international servitudes).
152. I.e., that part of the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan lying
east of the Jordon River.
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policymakers concerned with Middle East peace in their
efforts to shape a solution acceptable to all parties
involved.
In the narrow Israeli-Palestinian context, both
the above solutions of association mean a compromise
between the two historical national movements that have
been contending for Palestine throughout this century.1 53
For Israel, the obviation of a major component of the
Middle East conflict, achieved through such a compromise,
could produce results with far-reaching positive implica-
tions for its relationship with all Middle East coun-
tries.1 54 Moreover, Israel would be able to terminate
its military administration in the West Bank and Gaza
and thus to avoid inevitable undesirable alterations in
the character of its society that are concomitants of
having an army of occupation.155 Although either solu-
tion would serve Israel's basic interest in the West Bank
(i.e., its security interest1 56) the price--at least in
153, International law has no remedy for the thorny
problems that arise in the case of a conflict
between the equally legitimate rights of self-
determination of a number of peoples .... The-
classical example is that of Palestine...
[where] there are (and there have been for a
very long time) primarily two peoples: Arabs
and Jews. Both peoples are entitled to self-
determination, but each craves to determine
its political fate in the whole of Palestine....
In such circumstances, only partition of the
disputed area can resolve the conflicting
claims... [T]he only peaceful solution of the
Palestine question is partition between the
two Palestinian peoples: Jews and Arabs.
Dinstein, Collective Hwnan Rights of Peoples and Minorities, 25 Int'l
and Comp. L. Q. 102, 109-10 (1976).
154. For a discussion of the question whether such a solution
might be reached without the participation of some Arab states in the
peace arrangements, see De Palma, Biting the Bullet in the Middle
East, 58 For. Aff. 184 (1979),
155. To a certain degree, however, this outcome would be
reached with the withdrawal of the Israeli military government following
the establishment of the local self-governing authority in the West
Bank and Gaza. Framework for Peace in the Middle East, 17 Int'l Legal
Mat. 1466 (1977), pt. A., art. I(A).
156. See text accompanying notes 145, 148 supra.
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the eyes of some significant sectors in Israel's polity
and society--is extremely costly. Either solution would
entail expiration of the Israeli national aspirations in
regard to the West Bank. Thus, for Israel, the model of
association means a major step toward the settlement of
the Arab-Israeli conflict, with adequate assurances for
its security, coupled with the explicit recognition that
the areas of the West Bank and Gaza are destined for
Palestinian self-determination.1 5 7
For the Palestinians, either solution would be a
realization of what has long been denied them: a separ-
ate Palestinian state entity. Moreover, separate state-
hood implies more for the Palestinians than it does for
any other people Cexcept, by the way, the Jews): the
first and inescapable step for rehabilitation of their
refugee brethren. At the same time, however, not only
will the Palestinians have to give up their national
aspirations for what they call the Israeli parts of
Palestine, but they will be denied a military of their
157. According to the compromise formula I personally
advocate, Israel...would give up the large
majority of the areas which fell into its
hands in the 1967 War. Israel would do so not
because of any lack of historical affinity be-
tween the Jewish people and many of these areas....
Nonetheless, in order to attain a no less histori-
cally exalted goal, namely that of peace, such a
deliberate territorial compromise can be made.
Allon, supra note 137, at 44.
It is reasonable to assume that the establishment of a separ-
ate Palestinian entity in the West Bank and Gaza will increase the
problem Israel faces in regard to its 500,000 Arabs who since the
Six Day War have steadily moved toward full identification with
Palestinian nationalism. See Tessler, Israel's Arabs and the
Palestinian Problem, 31 llidd. E. J. 313 (1977) (analyzing identifi-
cation trends of Israeli Arabs); Peretz, supra note 129, at 49, 50
(attitudes of Israeli Arabs to State of Israel); W. Quandt, Decade
of Decisions 293-94 (1977) (concern for internal problems if Israel's
Arab population identifies with new state). Hence, in order to miti-
gate this problem, it behooves Israel to consider the possibility
of a special connection between its Arab population and the Palestin-
ian entity, established quid pro quo with a similar connection be-
tween Jewish settlers in the West Bank and Gaza and the State of
Israel. It might even be possible to devise a plan by which Arab
populated areas within Israel will be transferred to the Palestinian
entity in exchange for the annexation to Israel of some areas in the
West Bank in which Israeli settlements are located (e.g., Gush Etzion).
Cf. Tessler, supra, at 334-35 (positive effects on problem of Israeli
Arabs as by-product of Palestinian state).
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own in the West Bank and Gaza, 1 58  Thus, for the Pales-
tinians, the model of association means Palestinian
statehood while recognizing Israel's security interest
in the areas of the West Bank and Gaza.
Wfere either of the solutions of association adopted,
there is a serious question whether the Palestinians,
having gained a large portion of their objective, would
later upset the new status quo by directing their now
more formidable energies against Israel.
Though it is clear that, given the history of the
Palestinian-Israeli relationship, this is a real and
legitimate concern, such an outcome is not inevitable.
It might be assumed that the elite of the West Bank and
Gaza would have enough incentive at least for economic
cooperation with Israel. 1 5 9 Moreover, given Israel's
position, under each of the proposed solutions, to retali-
ate massively against any act within the West Bank and
Gaza that threatens its security, it might be also assumed
that the elite of these areas, recognizing that such re-
taliation might be disastrous for their state, would be
highly interested in avoiding such an outcome.160 In ad-
dition, given that Israel's presence would be restricted
158. If the Palestinians opt for association through integra-
tion with the East Bank of Jordan, they would, in fact, have their
own army: the army of the integrated state, which would, however,
be confined to the East Bank. Cf. Rubinstein, supra note 143, at
278-79 (advocating a solution in which the West Bank and Gaza com-
prise part of a greater unit having its own military outside these
areas). Even if the Palestinian choice were a separate state in the
West Bank and Gaza, Israel might be able to bring itself to allow
the Palestinian state gradtal acquisition of an independent military.
Thus, a schedule of "affirmative reaction" might be adopted by the
Palestinians and Israel, according to which the Palestinians would
be permitted to keep an army of their own, in both parts of their
state or in only one part of it (e.g., only in Gaza) and to increase
its size and armament at the end of every few years of friendly neigh-
borly relations with Israel.
159. See Rouleau, supra note 130, at 282-83; E. Tuma and H.
Darin-Drabkin, The Economic Case of Palestine, 15, 33, 103-11 (1978)
(economic viability of Palestinian state in West Bank and Gaza).
160. It is clear, however, that the behavior of the Palestinian
elite depends to a great extent on its global orientation. See dis-
cussion in text accompanying note 170.
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to military matters, there is a good chance that an as-
sociation in which Israel controls only the defense sec-
tor of its associate will stimulate a relatively low de-
gree of friction between the army stationed in the West
Bank and Gaza and the local population.161 Finally, if
irredentist desires existed in the West Bank and Gaza
after the establishment of association, it is likely
that they would be directed toward the East Bank rather
than against Israel. This last point brings us to the
second context in which we must evaluate the notion of
association for the West Bank and Gaza: i.e., the region-
al context.
It is clear that the solution of the Palestinian
problem, either through the establishment of a Palestin-
ian state in the West Bank and Gaza or through the inte-
gration of these areas with the East Bank, will have a
significant impact within the domestic context of every
Arab state in the Middle East. Lebanon, Saudi Arabia,
and Kuwait immediately come to mind.1 6 2 At the same
time, it is equally clear that the effects of such an
occurrence on the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan would be of
an immeasurably greater magnitude than on any other Arab
state.
In 1948, the army of Transjordan invaded Palestine
and gained control over the West Bank. The annexation
of the West Bank to the Hashemite Kingdom of Jordan in
1950 immediately made the Palestinians a majority in the
Kingdom: 900 000 out of a population of 1,300,000 were
Palestinians. 1 63 Thus, for almost two decades Jordan has
actually been a Palestinian state ruled by a non-Pales-
tinian monarch.1 6 4 During this period, the Palestinians
in the West Bank have never accepted the Hashemite rule
161. Admittedly, however, this aspect depends on the inten-
tions of the respective army and the topographical and demographic
conditions of the area involved.
162. See Cooley, Iran, the Palestinians, and the Gulf, 57
For. Aff. 1017, 1019-21, 1026-27 (1979) (discussing Palestinian in-
fluence in oil producing countries); When Arabs Fight Arabs, None
Can Afford to Gloat, N.Y. Times, Nov. 30, 1980, Section E, at 2,
col. 3 (Palestinian communities within Arab countries as potential
subversive force).
163. S. Mishal, West Bank/East Bank 2 (1978).
164. M. Reisman, supra note 135, at 48 ("The core of domestic
instability in Jordan lies in its foundation as a heterarchy, an
artificial Hashemite government divergent from the Palestinian
character of the population...." Id. at 46.)
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over them as fully legitimate or final. 1 65 On the ideo-
logical level, they have made a distinction between the
long-run optimum solution for their problem and their
short-run practical daily necessities. This pragmatic
outlook, together with the popularity among the inhabi-
tants of the West Bank of Pan-Arabic ideologies, has
legitimized their temporary co-operation with the
Hashemite regime. On the practical level, it is the
central government's monopoly over military power and
international economic aid, the government's tight poli-
tical control, and the geopolitical inferiority I 66 of
the West Bank that has mitigated secessionist tendencies.1 6 7
If a separate Palestinian state is established in
the West Bank and Gaza none of these conditions will
exist anymore. Given the military might of Israel, the
new state is unlikely, to consider Israel as a reasonable
target for accomplishment of its irredentist ambitions.
With a Palestinian majority in the East Bank of Jordan,1 68
such a Palestinian state will have an enormous incentive
to gain control over the East Bank in order to establish
a great Palestinian state on both banks of the Jordan.
If, on the other hand, the West Bank and Gaza are inte-
grated with the East Bank, the outcome will, for all
practical purposes, be a Palestinian state on both sides
of the Jordan. In that case, it would be only a matter
of time until pure Palestinian rule was established in
165. Mishal, supra note 163, at 22, 51-52, 72-73, 111, 115.
166. See id. at 15 (inhabitants of West Bank, defeated in 1948
war, have found themselves surrounded by Israel on one side and by
suspicious Hashemite regime of East Bank on other side).
167. See id. at 14-23 (discussing Jordan's policies toward
West Bank during 1949-1967, wane of separatism, and grant of condi-
tional legitimacy to Jordanian authority); Mishal, supra note 135,
at 211-12 (factors enabling Jordan to maintain status quo during
1949-1967); Baily, supra note 147, at 155-58.
168. See Peretz, supra note 129, at 44 (after 1948 tbree-
fourths of East Bank population was Palestinian); E. Said, Supra note
130, at 115 (discussing distribution of Palestinian population in
Middle East countries); Subversion or Osmosis?, The Economist, Oct.
22, 1977, at 64 (East Bank is locus of second greatest Palestinian
population: over 1 million).
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the integrated state.1 69 From the regional perspective,
then, it is not Israel but Jordan that has most to fear
from the establishment of some sort of a Palestinian en-
tity in the West Bank and Gaza.
The implications of these solutions of association
for the global context derive, to a great extent, from
the implications already noted within the framework of
the two narrow contexts. The PLO, which is widely recog-
nized as the authentic representative of the Palestinian
people,1 7 0 is in fact a loose coalition of a host of
169. The writer in The Economist described the Jordanian
dilemma as follows:
It is a nice calculation to work out which
future alternative arrangement would present
more danger to the Hashemite regime: an
independent Palestine or a unified state on
both banks of the Jordan River in which a
clear two-thirds of the population would be
Palestinian. Which is more to be feared:
subversion from across the Jordan or a slow
ingestion? The latter may well be the more
real threat, but because they fear subversion
more, the Jordanian regime seems prepared to
accept the danger of political osmosis.
Subversion or Osmosis?, The Economist, Oct, 22, 1977, at 66. See
also Rouleau, supra note 130, at 283 ("The leaders of the PLO must
wish ... to transform the Jordanian kingdom as it was before the
1967 war into a Palestinian state, but their ambition cannot be
realized as long as the Hashemite monarchy exists in Amman.") Indeed,
it is an essential element in Palestinian ideology that the East
Bank and the West Bank are actually one country inhabited by one
people: the Palestinians. Thus, Art. 2 of the Palestinian National
Covenant reads as follows: "Palestine with its boundaries that
existed at the time of the British Mandate is an integral regional
unit." For the text of the Covenant, see 3 J. Moore, supra note 147,
at 69R. Harkabi comments that "[t]he expression 'that existed at the
time of the British Mandate' is vague. The article is subject to
two interpretations: 1) The Palestinian State includes also Jordan
and thus supersedes it; 2) The West Bank is detached from Jordan."
Harkabi, The Palestinian National Covenant, 3 N.Y.U. J. Int'l L. &
Pol'y 209, 229 (1970). In 1971, at the Eighth Palestinian National
Congress, it was resolved that Jordan east of the river was part of
Palestine and that it must be liberated from its rulers no less than
the West Bank. Bailey, Supra note 147, at 161 n. 20.
170. See text accompanying note 134 supra.
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rival organizations. Their sources of funds, their
ideologies, and their identifications with global (and
regional) powers are diverse and often mutually hos-
tile.1 7 1 Thus, while it is clear that the PLO will have
a crucial role in the elite of any separate Palestinian
entity established in the West Bank and Gaza, it is not
clear which faction will be dominant, One can only
speculate, therefore, as to the global orientation that
entity will have. Indeed, it is within this context,
and not within the bilateral Israeli-Palestinian con-
text, that the establishment of a separate Palestinian
entity in the West Bank and Gaza might become a severe
threat to Israel's security as well as to world order.1 7 2
Moreover, since any Palestinian entity in the West Bank
171. See Quandt, Political and MNlitar Dimensions- of Contem-
pora PaZsti nian NationaZism, in V, Quandt, F. Jabber & A. Lesch, supra
note 130, at 52-78, 94-112 (discussion of different political-
military groups from 1967-1970); Stanley, Fragmentation and National
Liberation Movements: The PLO, 22 Orbis 1033 (1979) (examination of
organizational processes within "struggle group" from viewpoint of
disintegration); E. Said, supra note 130, at 159-63 (discussion of
Palestinian organizations and politics with focus on Fateh).
172. Looked at from the Soviet point of view, a PLO
dominated Arab state on the borders of Israel
and Jordan would offer the best of prospects
for the expansion of Soviet influence in the
Middle East, which is, beyond doubt, the over-
riding Soviet objective. Even the inevitable
conflicts between the discordant elements inside
the PLO might, in Soviet thinking, become less
acute if they could all turn their attention to
the aim of conquering Israel. Moreover, the
Soviet Union might well hope that if the Soviet
presence in the PLO state were sufficiently
massive, as it presumably would be, the J.S.A.
might be deterred from intervening to save
Israel.
Schapiro, The Soviet Union and the PLO, 23 Survey 193, 194, 200-02
(No. 3, 1877-78).
The campaign for a state which is more and more
explicitly a P.L.O. state including the West
Bank and the Gaza Strip is irrational from the
point of view of Western security interests.
The emergence of such a state would weaken
Israel, the strongest military power in the
Middle East, and the most reliable ally of the
West in the area, by necessity and conviction....
Establishing a new Arab state [in the West Bank
and Gaza] would injure Western interests, and
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and Gaza is a potential menace to the pro-Western
Hashemite regime of Jordan,173 it follows that with the
establishment of such an entity the 'West might face the
risk of a hostile element not only in the West Bank and
Gaza but on the East Rank of the Jordan River as well.1 7 4
The optimal solution to these dilemmas is either of
the two alternative associations proffered in this
Article. Israeli military presence in the West Bank is
of indispensable strategic value for world order both
with regard to the West Bank and Gaza Cif a Palestinian
state is established in these areas) and the East Bank
of Jordan (especially if a Palestinian state including
the East Bank is established).1 7 5 Western support of the
172. (Continued)
advance those of the Soviet Union, by
strengthening the Soviet position in the
region, and by increasing Arab dependence
on Soviet protection, It would weaken
Israel, which, since the fall of Iran, is
the most important Western ally in the area.
Rostow, supra note 59, at 152, 169. See also laloz, The FaZestinian
Guerri1lla Organizations and the Sovtet Union in Palestinian Arah
Politics 91, 94, 103, 104 (M. laoz ed, 1975) (discussion of past and
probable future relationship between Soviet Union and Palestinian
organizations, and Soviet intentions in regard to Palestinian state).
On U.S.-PLO relations since the Yom Kippur War of 1973, see E., Lerman,
PLO Attitudes Towards the U.S., 1973-1979 (1980, Hebrew).
173. See text accompanying notes 163-69 supra.
174. One look at the map will suffice to convey the geopoliti-
cally disastrous implications of that,
175. The value for world order of Israeli military presence
along the Jordan river was overwhelmingly proven in the extraordinary
circumstances of foreign invasion of Jordan during the crisis of
September 1970. See H. Kissinger, White House Years 594-631 (1979).
A message sent by the U.S. to Israel after the Jordanian crisis
had expired read as follows: "According to the latest available
information, the forces which invaded Jordan have withdrawn to Syria.
We believe that the steps Israel took have contributed measurably to
that withdrawal. We appreciate the prompt and positive Israeli
response to our approach...." Id. at 631. See also Quandt, supra
note 157, at 105-27 (discussion of U.S. management of crisis, U.S.-
Israeli cooperation, and after-crisis effects). It is clear, however,
that even short of such unusual conditions Israeli military control
over the West Bank and Gaza is a substantial contribution to world
order.
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notion of Palestinian self-determination in the West Bank
and Gaza could assure stability in these areas, and
throughout the 2iddle East, only if accompanied by insis-
tence on continued Israeli military presence in the West
Bank and Gaza. There is a way to satisfy all these inter-
ests: associate statehood.
Conclugion
The present status of the West Bank and Gaza is a
temporary one. All parties involved in the Middle East
conflict are cognizant of that. They are also aware
that change in the geopolitics of these areas is inevitable.
As is so often the case in situations of conflict, the
problem of the West Bank and Gaza is that of uniting the
parties directly involved toward a common goal of change.
In this Article the framework of associate statehood has
been presented as a feasible goal for the parties to
pursue in their effort to solve the problem of the West
Bank and Gaza. The analysis has been grounded in an
effort to identify the main interests of the parties in-
volved in the conflict.
For Israel, the main interest in the West Bank and
Gaza is its security interest. Any change diminishing
Israel's present military and political control over the
West Bank and Gaza has the potential to imperil its de-
fense competence. The Palestinians, on the other hand,
have an equally vested interest in change. Their main
interest with regard to the West Bank and Gaza is to
realize their right of self-determination in these areas.
For them, any change--except the unlikely possibility of
annexation to Israel--means getting closer to attainment
of that goal.
Under the solution of associate statehood, it is
incumbent on Israel to recognize that the West Bank and
Gaza are destined to be the locus for Palestinian self-
determination. By the same token, it is incumbent on the
Palestinians to recognize that the Israeli security
interest in the West Bank and Gaza is legitimate and that
Israel's apprehension at the prospect of future dangers
from an independent West Bank and Gaza is well-founded.
Associate statehood is not a perfect solution for
any of the parties involved in the conflict. But, short
of vanquishing one's opponent, there are no "perfect"
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solutions for any conflict. One of the ways to evaluate
the potential of the solution of association is to com-
pare it with other possible solutions. Such a compre-
hensive analysis cannot be accomplished within the con-
fines of this Article. Nonetheless, for Israel many of
the risks involved in this option are extant under any
other feasible solution, while for the Palestinians the
solution of association assures the utmost amount of
self-determination and sovereignty possible under current
circumstances. What makes associate statehood an emi-
nent compromise solution for some conflicts is its ability
to maximize the interests of all parties involved in a
conflict. It is time for the parties contending over
Palestine to adopt it.
